Magistri Petri Lombardi
Arch. Episc. Parisiensis

Sententiarum Quatuor Libri

LIBER PRIMUS SENTENTIARUM.

DE DEI UNITATE ET TRINITATE
DISTINCTIO XX.
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 366-367.
Cum Notitiis Editorum Quaracchi

Cap. I.

Quod aliqua personarum non excedit aliam potentia.

Nunc ostendere restat, quomodo aliqua harum personarum aliam non excellat potentia, ut, sicut una et indifferens est magnitudo trium, ita una et indifferens monstretur potentia trium. Sciendum est igitur, quia[1] non est potentior Pater Filio, nec Filius vel Pater Spiritu sancto, nec maiorem potentiam habent duo vel tres simul quam singulis eorum; quia nec plus potest Pater simul et Filius quam solus Spiritus sanctus, nec hi tres simul plus possunt quam singulus eorum, quia omnipotentiam, quam habet Pater, et Filius accepit nascendo et Spiritus sanctus procedendo. Quod Augustinus rationibus et auctoritatibus probabiliter astruit in libro contra Maximinum,[2] qui dicebat Patrem potentiorem ac meliorem Filio.

Cap. II.

Quod non minus potest Filius quam Pater.

« Nihil, inquit,[3] Patre minus habet ille qui dicit: *Omnia quae habet Pater, mea sunt* ». « Nam si minus habet in potestate aliquid quam Pater, non sunt eius omnia, quae habet Pater; sed eius sunt omnia quae habet Pater; tantam igitur habet potestatem Filius, quantam Pater »: « aequalis ergo est Patri. Non enim potest qui accepit

Master Peter Lombard
Archbishop of Paris

The Four Books of Sentences

THE FIRST BOOK OF THE SENTENCES

ON THE UNITY AND TRINITY OF GOD
DISTINCTION 20
Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 366-367.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Chapter I.

That None of the Persons exceeds Another in power.

Now it remains to show, in what manner None of these Persons excels Another in power, so that there be shown, just as one and un-differing is the magnitude of the Three, so one and un-differing the power of the Three. It must be known, therefore, that[1] the Father is not more potent than the Son, nor the Son and/or Father than the Holy Spirit, nor do Two and/or Three have more power than Each of Them; because neither is the Father and the Son together more able [plus possunt] than the Holy Spirit alone, nor are these Three more able than Each of Them, because the omnipotence, which the Father has, both the Son accepts by being born, and the Holy Spirit by proceeding. Which (argument St.) Augustine constructs in a manner provable by reasons and authorities in the book Against Maximinus,[2] who said that the Father (is) more potent and better than the Son.

Chapter II*.*

That the Son is no less able than the Father

« Nothing », he says,[3] « less than the Father has He, who says: *All which the Father has, are Mine* ». « For if in power He has anything less than the Father, they are not all His, which the Father Has, but all which the Father has are His; therefore the Son has as much power, as the Father »: « therefore He is equal to the Father. For He,

inaequalis esse ei qui dedit ».

who accepts (all), cannot be unequal to Him, who has given (all) ».

[1] Edd. 5, 8 *quod*.
[2] Vat. et aliae edd. *in libro tertio contra Maximinum*; codd. et ed. 1 sic: *in libro contra Maxim*. In edd. impressis Augustini duo tantum sunt libri contra Maximinum. Sed in antiquis mss. exemplaribus huius operis opusculum « Collatio Augustini cum Maximino » inscribebatur *primus* liber. c. M., et illi duo *secundus* et *tertius*. Textus sequens sunt ex secundo libro iuxta computationem modernam.
[3] Libr. II. c. 14. n. 7. — Locus Scripturae est Ioan. 16, 15. Duo loci sequentes Augustini sunt ibid. n. 9. et 7.

[1] Editions 5 and 8 read *that* [quod].
[2] The Vatican edition and the other editions have *in the third book Against Maximinum* [in librio tertio contra Maximinum]; the codices and edition 1 have: *in the book Against Maxim.* [in libro contra Maxim.]. In the printed editions of (St.) Augustine's works there are only two books Against Maximinum. But in the ancient copies of the manuscripts of this work, « Collatio Augustini cum Maximino », the *first* book was entitled primus liber. c. M., and the other two *the second* and *third* books. The text cited by Master Peter is from the second book, according to the modern reckoning.
[3] Book II,ch. 14. n. 7. — The passage of Scripture is Jn. 16:15. The two following passages of (St.) Augustine are ibid., nn. 9 and 7.

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Cap. III.

De obiectionibus haereticis contra hoc, et responsionibus catholicis.

« Tu autem hoc de potentia sapis, quod potens sit Filius, sed potentior Pater, ut secundum doctrinam verstram potens potentem potuerit gignere, et non omnipotens omnipotentem. Habet ergo Pater omnipotentiam, quam non habet Filius; at si hoc est, falsum est quod ait Filius: *Omnia quae habet Pater, mea sunt* ».[1]

« Sed, inquis, Pater a nemine potentiam accepit, Filius autem a Patre. Fatemur et nos, Filium accepisse potentiam ab illo, de quo natus est potens; Patri vero potentiam nullus dedit, quia nullus eum genuit. Gignendo enim dedit potentiam Pater Filio, sicut omnia quae habet in substantia sua, gignendo dedit ei quem genuit de substantia sua ».[2]

« Sed quaeritur, utrum tantam quanta ipsi est potentiam Pater Filio dederit, an minorem. Si tantum, non solum potentem, sed etiam omnipotentem genuisse Omnipotens intelligitur; si vero minorem, quomodo omnia quae habet Pater, Filii sunt? Si Patris omnipotentia Filii non est, non omnia procul dubio, quae habet Pater, Filii sunt ».[3] At omnia Filii sunt; omnipotentia ergo Patris etiam Filii est: non

Chapter III

On the objections of heretics against this, and the response of Catholics.

« You, moreover, know this of the power, that the Son is potent, but the Father more potent, since according to your doctrine a potent could beget a potent, and not an omnipotent an omnipotent. Therefore, the Father has an omnipotence, which the Son does not have; but if this is (so), what the Son says is false: *All which the Father has, are Mine* ».[1]

« But, you ask, the Father accepts power from no one; however the Son (does) from the Father. We say also, that the Son has accepted power from Him, from whom He has been born potent; but no one gave power to the Father, because no one begot Him. For by begetting the Father gave power to the Son, just as all which He has in His own Substance, by begetting He gave to Him whom He begot of His own Substance ».[2]

« But it is asked, whether the Father gave as much power to the Son as was His, or whether less. If as much, the Omnipotent is understood to have begotten not only a potent, but also an Omnipotent; but if less, in what manner are all, which the Father has, the Son's? If the omnipotence of the Father is not the Son's, (it is) not far from doubt that all, which the Father has, are the Son's ».[3] But all are the Son's; therefore the

est ergo Pater potentior Filio.

omnipotence of the Father is also the Son's: therefore the Father is not more potent than the Son.

Item, alio modo probat Filium aequalem Patri contra Maximinum[4] ita dicens: « Tu dicis, quod Pater genuit Filium minorem se ipso, in quo et Patri derogas, qui si Filium unicum minorem genuit, aut non potuit, aut non voluit gignere aequalem. Si dicas, quia non voluit, eum invidum esse dixisti; si autem non potuit, ubi est omnipotentia Dei Patris? Prorsus ad hunc articulum res colligitur, ut Deus Pater aequalem sibi gignere Filium aut non potuerit, aut noluerit. Si non potuit, infirmus; si noluit, invidus invenitur. Sed utrumque hoc falsum est: Patri igitur Filius verus aequalis est. Genuit ergo Pater sibi aequalem Filium et ab utroque precedit utrique aequalis Spiritus sanctus ». « Si enim formam suam, ut ait Augustinus contra eundem,[5] Pater in unico Filio plenam gignere potuit, nec tamen plenam genuit, sed minorem, cogimini Patrem invidum dicere ». Plenum ergo Deum et aequalem sibi genuit Filium.

Likewise, in another manner he proves against Maximinus[4] that the Son (is) equal to the Father, thus saying: « You say, that the Father begot the Son less than Himself, in which you also derogate the Father, who, if He begot only a lesser [unicum minorem] Son, either could not, or would not, beget an Equal. If you say, that He would not, you have said that He is envious [invidum]; but if He could not, where is the omnipotence of God the Father? Further, according to this article (of your faith) one gathers [res colligitur], that God the Father either could not, or was unwilling to beget a Son equal to Himself. If He could not, (His is) infirm; if He was unwilling, He is found (to be) envious. But each consequent [utrumque hoc] is false: therefore the Son is the true equal to the Father. Therefore the Father begot a Son equal to Himself and from Each there proceeds an Equal to Each, the Holy Spirit ». « For if the Father could beget », as (St.) Augustine says against the same,[5] « His own full Form in an only Son, and yet did not beget It full, but lesser, we are driven to say that the Father (is) envious ». Therefore He begot a God full and equal to Himself, the Son.

Hoc autem per similitudinem humanam ita esse demonstrat inquiens:[6] « Homo pater, si potuisset, aequalem Filium genuisset. Quis ergo, audeat dicere, quod hoc Omnipotens non potuit? Addo etiam, quia si posset homo, maiorem melioremque se ipso gigneret Filium. Sed maius vel melius Deo quidquam esse non potest ». « Deus ergo cur non aequalem, ut ais, Filium genuit, cui nec anni necessarii fuerunt, per quos adimpleretur aequalitas, nec omnipotentia defuit. An forte noluit? ergo, quod absit, invidit; sed non invidit: aequalem igitur genuit Filium ».[7] « Credamus ergo, Filium ei esse aequalem ».

Moreover, he demonstrates through a similitude to man that this is so, inquiring:[6] « A man, as a father, if he were able, would have begotten an equal Son. Therefore, who dares to say, that the Omnipotent could not (do) this? I add also, because if a man were able, he would beget a Son greater and better than himself. But no one at all can be greater and/or better than God ». « Therefore, why did not God beget an equal, as you say, Son, for whom neither were years, through which an equality would be fulfilled, necessary, nor the omnipotence lacking. Or perhaps He was unwilling? therefore, far be it, He envied (Him); but He did not envy (Him): therefore He begot an equal Son ».[7] « We believe, therefore, that the Son is equal to Him ».

« Sed forte dices: eo ipso maior est Pater Filio, quia de nullo genitus genuit tamen aequalem. Ad quod cito respondeo: immo ideo non est maior Pater Filio, quia aequalem genuit. Originis enim quaestio

« But perhaps you will say: the Father is greater than the Son for this very reason, that He has begotten a Begotten from nothing, yet an Equal. To which I swiftly respond: nay, for that reason the Father is

ista est, quis de quo sit; aequalitatis autem, qualis aut quantus sit »,[8] quod est dicere: ad originem pertinet quaestio, qua quaeritur, quis de quo sit; ad aequalitatem vero illa qua quaeritur, qualis aut quantus sit. « Nec cum dicitur Filius a Patre genitus, ostenditur inaequalitas substantiae, sed ordo naturae, non quo alter prior esset altero, sed quo alter est ex altero ».[9] Non ergo secundum hoc, quod Pater genuit, et Filius genitus est, vel Spiritus sanctus ab utroque procedit, aequalitas vel inaequalitas ibi existit, quia non secundum hoc alia persona alii aequalis vel inaequalis dicitur. Ecce aequalitas Trinitatis et una eademque substantia, quantum breviter potuimus, demonstrata est in superioribus,[10] qualiter scilicet aliqua trium personarum quamlibet aliam nec aeternitate nec magnitudo nec potentia excellat.

not greater than the Son, because He begot an Equal. For this question of yours is (one) of the origin, 'who is from who?'; but (one) of equality is 'of what kind or how much is it?'»,[8] which is to say: to the origin pertains the question, by which there is asked, 'who is from who?'; however to equality that by which there is asked, 'of what kind or how much is Any?'. « Nor when the Son is said (to be) begotten from the Father, is there shown an inequality of Substance, but (rather) an order of nature, not by which the One would be prior to the Other, but by which the One is out of the Other ».[9] Therefore, not according to this, that the Father begot, and the Son has been begotten, and/or the Holy Spirit has proceeded from Each, does equality and/or inequality exist There, because not according to this is one Person said (to be) equal and/or unequal to the Other. Behold the equality of the Trinity and the one and same Substance, as much as we briefly were able, has been demonstrated in the above (sentences),[10] namely, in what manner Any of the Three Persons in neither eternity nor magnitude nor power excels any Other.

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[1] Ibid. c. 12. n. 1. — In hoc textu Augustini Vat. cum pluribus edd. verbo *gignere* praemittit *generare vel* contra codd. et originale.
[2] Loc. cit. paucis interpositis. — Hic codd. A B C et ed. 1 *Fateamur* pro *Fatemur*.
[3] Ibid. immediate post. — In principio textus post *utrum* Vat. cum paucis edd. male addit *ei*. Finito textu, post *omnia* Vat. cum aliis edd. contra 1, 2, 3, 7, et omnes codd. addit *quae habet Pater*, quod facile ex praecedentibus suppleri potest.
[4] Libr. II. c. 7. et 5. Eadem docet Augustinus in libr. LXXXIII. Quest. q. 50.
[5] Ibid. cap. 15. n. 1.
[6] Ibid. cap. 18, n. 3, ubi Vat. et plures edd. post *Addo etiam* omittunt *quia*, refragantibus codd. B C D E, ed. 1 et originali.
[7] Ibid. c. 15. n. 5. — Quae sequuntur, leguntur ibid. c. 18. n. 3.
[8] Ibid. immediate post, ubi Vat. et edd. 4, 8, 9 post *quia aequalem* adiiciunt *sibi*, contra alias edd., codd. et originale.
[9] Ibid. cap. 14. n. 8. — Solummodo Vat. post *prior* male legit *est* pro *esset*.
[10] Scilicet in hac et praecedente dist.

[1] Ibid., ch. 12, n. 1. — In this text of (St.) Augustine, the Vatican edition, together with very many editions, preface the word *beget* [gignere] with *generate and/or* [generare vel], contrary to the codices and the original.
[2] Loc. cit., with a few things interposed. — Here codices A B and C and edition 1 read *Let us say* [Fateamur] for *We say* [Fatemur].
[3] Ibid., immediately after. — At the beginning of the text, after *whether* [utrum] the Vatican edition, together with a few editions, badly adds *to Him* [et]. After the citation's end, the Vatican edition, together with the other editions, contrary to editions 1, 2, 3 and 7, and to all the codices, after *all* [omnia] add *which the Father has* [quae habet Pater], which easily can be supplied from the preceding (arguments).
[4] Book. II, ch. 7 and 5. (St.) Augustine teaches the same in the book 83 Questions, q. 50.
[5] Ibid., chapter 15, n. 1.
[6] Ibid., chapter 18, n. 3, where the Vatican edition and very many editions, after *I add also* [Addo etiam] omits *because* [quia], breaking with codices B C D and E, edition 1 and the original.
[7] Ibid., chapter. 15, n. 5. — Those which follow, are read in ibid., ch. 18, n. 3.
[8] Ibid., immediately after, where the Vatican edition and editions 4, 8, and 9, read *because He begot an Equal to Himself* [quia aequalem sibi genuit], contrary to the other editions, codices and the

original.
[9] Ibid., chapter 14, n. 8. — On the Vatican edition reads badly *is prior* [prior est] for *would be prior* [prior esset].
[10] That is, in this and the preceding distinction.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XX.

De trium personarum aequalitate quantum ad potentiam et virtutem.

ARTICULUS I.

Quaestio I.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 368-370.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Nunc restat, quomodo aliqua harum personarum etc.

DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra ostendit Magister aequalitatem personarum quantum ad *magnitudinem*, hic ostendit aequalitatem[1] quantum ad *potentiam* et *virtutem*. Et habet haec pars tres partes. In *prima* proponit quod intendit.[2] In *secunda* probat, ibi: *Nihil, inquit, Patre minus habet* etc. In *tertia* dubium sive obiectionem in contrarium dissolvit, ibi: *Sed forte dices, eo ipso maior*

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XX

On the equality of the Three Persons as much as regards power and virtue.

ARTICLE I

Question 1

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 368-370.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Now it remains to show, in what manner None of these Persons etc..

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

Above Master (Peter) shows the equality of the Persons as much as regards *magnitude*, here he shows the equality[1] as much as regards *power* and *virtue*. And this part has three parts. In the *first* he proposes what he intends.[2] In the *second* he proves (it), there (where he says): *Nothing less than the Father has He* etc.. In the *third* he dissolves the doubt or objection in the

est etc.

contrary, there (where he says): *But perhaps you will say: the Father is greater* etc..

Prima et ultima parte remanentibus indivisis, *media* dividitur in tres, secundum tres probationes sive rationes, quarum prima sumta est ab auctoritate Domini, Ioannis decimo sexto:[3] *Omnia, quae habet Pater, mea sunt*. Secunda sumta est per deductionem ad impossibile, quia si non genuit aequalem, aut potuit et noluit, et ita fuit invidus; aut voluit et non potuit, et ita fuit impotens; et haec ponitur[4] ibi: *Item alio modo probat Filium aequalem Patri*. Tertio ratio est ostensiva, sumta per *simile* in generatione creata et ponitur ibi: *Hoc autem per similitudinem humanam*.

With the first and last part remaining undivided, the *middle one* is divided into three, according to three proofs or reasons, the first of which has been taken from the authority of the Lord, in the sixteenth (chapter of the Gospel of St.) John:[3] *All, which the Father has, are Mine*. The second has been taken through a deduction ad impossibile, because if He has not begotten an Equal, either He could and was unwilling, and thus was envious; or He wanted to and could not, and thus was impotent; and this is posited[4] there (where he says): *Likewise, in another manner he proves against Maximinus that the Son (is) equal to the Father*. The third reason is demonstrative [ostensiva], taken through the *simile* in created generation and is posited there (where he says): *Moreover, he demonstrates through a similitude to man that this is so*.

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam eorum, quae dicuntur in praesenti distinctione, duo principaliter quaeruntur.

Primo, quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit ponere potentiae adaequationem.
Secundo, utrum in divinis sit ponere ordinem.

Quantum ad primum quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit ponere potentiae[5] adaequationem quantum ad extentionem possibilium.
Secundo, utrum sit ibi aequatio[6] quantum ad intensionem potentiae.

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

For an understanding of those (things), which are said in the present Distinction, two (things) are principally asked:

First there is asked, whether among the divine there is a positing of an adequation of power.
Second, whether among the divine there is a positing of order.

As much as regards the first two (things) are asked:

First there is asked, whether among the divine there is a positing of an adequation of power[5] as much as regards (its) extension to possible.
Second, whether there is There an equation[6] as much as regards the intensity [intensionem] of power.

ARTICULUS I.

De potentiae adaequatione in divinis.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum in divinis personis potentia sit aequalis quantum ad extensionem possibilium.

QUOD SIT IBI ponere potentiae adaequationem quantum ad numerum

ARTICLE I

On the adequation of power among the divine.

QUESTION 1

Whether among the Divine Persons there is equal power as much as regards (its) extension to possibles.

THAT THERE IS THERE a positing of the adequation of power, as much as regards

possibilium ostenditur sic.

1. Quaecumque habent eandem naturam, habent eandem potentiam naturalem;[7] sed quaecumque habent omnino eandem potentiam, quidquid potest unum, et alterum; sed Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus habent eandem potentiam: ergo etc.

2. Item, quaecumque habent omnino eandem operationem, nihil potest unum operari sine altero; sed Pater et Filius habent eandem operationem: ergo nihil potest Pater sine Filio, Ioannis quinto:[8] *Quaecumque Pater facit, haec omnia similiter Filius facit*.

3. Item, nullus potest plura omnipotente; sed Verbum Dei est omnipotens, sicut dicitur Sapientiae decimo octavo:[9] *Omnipotens sermo tuus, Domine* etc. Maior patet, quia qui omne dicit nihil excipit.

the number of possibles, is shown in this manner:

1. Whatsoever have the same nature, have the same natural power;[7] but whatsoever have entirely the same power, whatever one can (do), the other also (can); but the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit have the same power: ergo etc..

2. Likewise, whatsoever have entirely the same operation, one can work nothing without the other; but the Father and the Son have the same operation: therefore the Father can (do) nothing without the Son, according to the fifth (chapter of the Gospel of St.) John:[8] *Whatsoever the Father does, all these the Son does similarly*.

3. Likewise, no one can (do) more (things) that an Omnipotent; but the Word of God is omnipotent, just as is said in the eighteenth (chapter) of Wisdom:[9] *Omnipotent Thy Word, Lord* etc. The major is clear, because he who says “all” (i. e. “omni-“) excepts nothing.

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[1] In Vat. et paucis codd. deest *aequalitatem*.
[2] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *intenditur, scilicet quod alia persona non excedit aliam potentia*.
[3] Vers. 15, in quo textu Vulgata habet *quaecumque* pro *quae*.
[4] Cod. T *hoc ponit*.
[5] Supplevimus ex plurmis mss. et edd. 1, 4, 5 *potentiae*.
[6] Cod. V *adequatio*.
[7] De hac propositione cfr. supra pag. 51 nota 11. — Paulo infra cod. M terminis *et alterum* praefigit verbum *potest* certe supplendum.
[8] Vers. 19, ubi Vulgata: Quaecumque enim ille (Pater) fecerit, haec et Filius similiter facit.
[9] Vers. 15, in quo textu Vulgata omittit *Domine*.

[1] In the Vatican edition and a few codices, there is lacking *equality* [aequalitatem].
[2] The Vatican edition, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, reads *is intended, that is, that no Person exceeds Another in power* [intenditur, scilicet quod alia persona non excedit aliam potentia].
[3] Verse 15, in which text the Vulgate has *whichsoever* [quaecumque] for *which* [quae].
[4] Codex T has *this he puts* [hoc ponit].
[5] We have supplied from very many manuscripts and editions 1, 4 and 5, *of power* [potentiae].
[6] Codex V has *adequation* [adequatio].
[7] On this proposition, cf. above Dist. 2, a. sole, q. 1, page 51, footnote 11. — A little below this codex M prefixes to the terms *the other also* [et alterum] *can* [potest], which certainly is to be supplied.
[8] Verse 19, where the Vulgate reads: For whatsoever He will do, this also the Son similarly does [Quaecumque enim ille fecerit, haec et Filius similiter facit].
[9] Verse 15, in which text the Vulgate omits *Lord* [Domine].

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4. Item, infinitis non est ponere aliqua esse plura;[1] sed Filius potest infinita, quia non potest tot, quin plura: ergo Pater non potest plura quam Filius, pari ratione nec quam Spiritus sanctus.

4. Likewise, there is no positing that there are any more[1] than the infinite; but the Son can (do) infinite (things), because He cannot do all, if (He can do) more: therefore the Father cannot (do) more than the Son, nor for an equal reason (more) than the Holy Spirit.

Contra: 1. Quanto producta sunt magis distantia, tanto potentia producens est latior sive amplior, sed potentia Patris se extendit ad creatum et increatum, potentia Filii ad creatum tantum, et magis distat creatum et increatum quam creata[2] solum: ergo etc.

On the contrary: 1. As much as products are more distant, so much in power is the one producing wider or fuller, but the power of the Father extends itself to the created and the uncreated, the power of the Son to the created only, and more distant is the created and uncreated than only created (things):[2] ergo etc..

2. Item, Filius Dei et creatura sunt aliud et aliud, quia creatura est quid creatum, sed Filius est essentia increata: ergo si[3] Filius et creatura sunt aliud et aliud, ergo plura: ergo potentia, quae potest in Filium et creaturam, potentior est, quam quae potest in creaturam tantum, sive potens est in plura: sed potentia Patris est talis: ergo etc.

2. Likewise, the Son of God is one (thing) and a creature another, because a creature is something created, but the Son of God is the uncreated Essence: therefore if[3] the Son is one (thing) and a creature another, therefore (together they are) more: therefore the power, which can (act) upon the Son and a creature, is more potent, than that which can (act) upon a creature only, or is potent upon many (things): but the power of the Father is such (a power): ergo etc..

3. Item, tantum vel aeque magnum vel maius est producere personam aequalem, sicut creaturam; sed Pater potest sine Filio producere personam, ergo et producere creaturam: ergo videtur, quod potentia in Patre se extendat ad plura.

3. Likewise, it is as much as and/or equally great and/or greater to produce an equal personal, such as a creature; but the Father can without the Son produce a Person and produce a creature: therefore it seems, that the power in the Father extends itself to more.

4. Item, quamvis Spiritus sanctus[4] et Filius non sint aliquid plus, tamen plures sunt quam Filius solus: ergo cum in Patre potentia possit in productionem utriusque, in Filio in alteram tantum, in plures[5] potest potentia in Patre quam in Filio: ergo extensione possibilium est maior.

4. Likewise, although the Holy Spirit[4] and the Son are not Something more, yet they are More than the Son alone: therefore since in the Father the power is potent [possit] in the production of Each, in the Son (it is potent) in One of the Two only, the power in the Father is potent upon More[5] than in the Son: therefore in extension to possibles it is greater.

CONCLUSIO.

Potentia essentialis in divinis personis est aequalis quantum ad extensionem possibilium.

CONCLUSION

The power of the Essence among the Divine Persons is equal as much as regards (its) extension to possibles.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod loquendo de potentia essentiali, quae est respectu actus essentialis sive productionis, ad nihil se extendit in Patre, ad quod pariter non extendat se in Filio. Et ideo, quia aequalitas[6] consistit quantum ad potentiam essentialem, concedendum est sine calumnia, quod Pater et Filius aequaliter sunt[7] potentes quantum ad extensionem possibilium.

I respond: It must be said, that in speaking of the power of the Essence [potential essentiali], which is in respect to the act of the Essence or (that) of production, it, in the Father, extends itself to nothing, to which it does not, on a par [pariter], extend itself, in the Son. And for that reason, because an equality [aequalitas] (of power)[6] consists as much as regards the power of the Essence, it must be conceded without calumny, that the Father and the Son are[7] equally [aequaliter]

potent as much as regards (its) extension to possibles.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod latior est potentia, quae potest in magis distantia; dicendum, quod istud verum est de potentia eodem modo dicta et quantum ad consimilem modum producendi; sed Patrem posse producere quid creatum est potentiae essentialis et operis creationis; Patrem vero posse producere Filium est potentiae ut in persona et generationis; ideo ratio illa non valet.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected in the contrary, that, wider is the power, which can (act) at a greater distance; it must be said, that that is true of power said in the same manner and as much as regards a completely similar manner of producing; but 'that the Father can produced something created' belongs to the power of the Essence and to the work of creation; however 'that the Father can produce the Son' belongs to power as (it is) in a Person and to generation; for that reason that reckoning is not valid.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod creatura et Filius sunt plura; dicendum, quod verum est, quod sunt *plura*, et[8] tamen non sunt *plura producta*. Quamvis enim Filius sit aliud quam creatura, tamen non est aliud productum. Filius enim est essentia et natura, sed tamen non est essentia vel natura producta, quia producere Filium non est producere *aliquid*, sed *aliquem*. Et ideo non sequitur, quod producere Filium et creaturam sit posse producere plura quam[9] producere alterum.

2. To that which is objected, that a creature and the Son are more; it must be said that it is true, that they are *more*, and[8] yet they are not *more products*. For although the Son is other than a creature, yet He is not another product. For the Son is an essence and a nature, but yet is not a produced essence and/or nature, because 'to produce the Son' is not 'to produce *something*, but *Someone*'. And for that reason it does not follow, that 'to produce the Son and a creature' is 'to be able to produce more than producing[9] one of the two'.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod producit personam sine Filio; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia cum producere creaturam sit producere essentiam, tam productio quam potentia est essentialis; et quia essentia est indivisa[10] in Patre et Filio, ideo et potentia et actio, proinde et productio illa. Quia vero producere Filium est producere personam, ideo productio illa et potentia dicit quid personale; et quoniam Pater et Filius non conveniunt in persona, sed in essentia, ideo[11] patet etc.

3. To that which is objected, that He produces a Person without the Son; it must be said, that it is not similar, because since 'to produce a creature' is 'to produce an essence', the production as much as the power belongs to an essence; and because the Essence in the Father and the Son is undivided,[10] for that reason also the power and the action, hence in virtue of this [proinde] also that production. However, because 'to produce the Son' is 'to produce a person', for that reason that production and power means something personal; and since the Father and the Son do not convene in a person, but in the Essence, for that reason[11] it is clear etc..

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt plures etc.; dicendum, quod verum est, quod potest etiam in plures, sed quantum ad hoc non attenditur aequalitas vel inaequalitas, ut visum est.[12]

4. To that which is objected, that the Son and the Holy Spirit are More etc.; it must be said, that it is true, that (the Father) can also (act) upon More, but as much as regards this, equality and/or inequality is not attained, as has been seen.[12]

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Non agitur hic de *potentia*, quatenus distinguitur contra *actum*, quae omnino removenda est a Deo, sed de potentia,

I. Here one does not deal with *power* (i.e. potency), to the extend that it is distinguished against *act*, which (potency) is

quatenus est principium activum et effectum aliorum, sive de omnipotentia. — Aequalitas huius potentiae intelligi potest vel *extensive* sive quoad numerum causabilium, vel *intensive* sive, ut dicit Richard. a Med. (loc. cit. infra), quan- / -tum . . .

to be entirely removed from God, but with power, to the extent that it is an active principle and the effect of others, or of omnipotence. — The equality of this power can be understood either *extensively* or in regard to the number of causables, or *intensively* or, as Richard of Middleton (loc. cit. below), as much . . .

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[1] Propositio haec communiter ita exhibetur: infinito non potest fieri additio. — Aliqui codd. ut C I U cc verbo *infinitis* praemittunt *in* et cod. U *si in*. Dein pauci codd. ut S Y omittunt *aliqua*.
[2] Ita maior pars codd. cum edd. 2, 3; alii ut I K X Z aa ee legunt vel *creatum* vel cum ed. 1 et Vat. *creatura*, sed minus distincte. Paulo ante cod. Z *Spiritus sancti* pro *Filii*, quae lectio per se praeferenda videri posset, sed ex responsione, infra posita patet, quod nomine *potentiae* intelligitur praeter potentiam *creandi* potentia *generandi*, quae soli Patri competit.
[3] Addendo particulam *si* praestamus meliorem lectionem, quae et in multis mss. ut A F G H S T Y etc. et ed. 1 reperitur.
[4] Plures codd. ut A I T W aa bb *Pater* loco *Spiritus sanctus*, sed contra subnexa.
[5] Praeferimus lectionem aliquorum mss. ut E X Z ponendo *plures* pro *plura*, utpote quae magis cum praecedentibus cohaeret.
[6] Supple: *potentiae*; Vat. autem contra finem in hac quaestione a S. Doctore intentum addit *personarum*, quod deest in mss. et ed. 1. Paulo supra post *Filio* codd. aa bb addunt *et Spiritus sancto*.
[7] Vat. praeter fidem plurimorum codd. et ed. 1 *sint*. Cod. bb post *Filius* adiungit *et Spiritus sanctus*.
[8] Fide multorum mss. ut A S T V W X Y aa bb cc et edd. 2, 3, 6 supplevimus particulam *et*, pro qua plures codd. ut G H I K Z cum ed. 1 ponunt *sed*, quamque Vat. cum uno alterove codice omittit. Immediate post in Vat., contradicentibus vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1, deest *sunt*.
[9] Minus bene et antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 reluctantibus, Vat. adiungit *posse*; quodsi lectionem Vat. servare velis, addas cum cod. K *posse* etiam supra post *sequitur quod*.
[10] Ita mss. cum ed. 1, excepto codice cc, qui cum Vat. ponit *individua*.
[11] Ex plurimis codd. et ed. 1 supplevimus *ideo*.
[12] In corp. huius q.

[1] This proposition is commonly exhibited thus: to the infinite an addition cannot be made. — Some codices, such as C I U and cc, read *in the infinite* [in infinitis], and codex U *if . . . in the infinite* [si in infinitis] for *than the infinite* [infinitis]. Then a few codices, such as S and Y, omit *any* [aliqua].
[2] Thus the greater part of the codices, together with editions 2 and 3; others, such as I K X Z aa and ee, read either *the created* [creatum] and/or together with edition 1 and the Vatican edition, *a creature* [creatura], but less distinctly. A little before this, codex Z reads *of the Holy Spirit* [Spiritus sancti] for *of the Son* [Filii], which reading per se could seem to be preferred, but from the response, posited below, it is clear, that the noun *power* [potentia] is understood, besides the power of *creating*, as the power of *generating*, which suits the Father alone.
[3] By adding the particle *if* [si], we offer the better reading, which also is found in many manuscripts, such as A F G H S T Y etc., and edition 1.
[4] Very many codices, such as A I T W aa and bb, have *the Father* [Pater] in place of *the Holy Spirit* [Spiritus sanctus], but contrary to what follows.
[5] We prefer the reading of some of the manuscripts, such as E X and Z, *More (Persons)* [plures] for *more (beings or things)* [plura], as it is more coherent with the preceding.
[6] Supply: *of power*; but the Vatican edition, contrary to the end intended in this question by the Seraphic Doctor, adds *of the Persons* [Personarum], which is lacking in the manuscripts and edition 1. A little above this after *in the Son* [in Filio], codices aa and bb add *and the Holy Spirit* [et Spiritu sancto].
[7] The Vatican edition, not trusting in very many codices and edition 1, has the subjunctive form of *are* [sint].
[8] Trusting in many manuscripts, such as A S T V W X Y aa bb and cc, and editions 2, 3 and 6, we have supplied the particle *and* [et], in place of which very many codices, such as G H I K Z, together with edition 1, put *but* [sed], and which the Vatican edition, together with one or the other codex omits. Immediately after this, in the Vatican edition, with the older manuscripts and edition 1 contradicting this, there is lacking *they are* [sunt].
[9] Less well, and with the more ancient manuscripts striving against this, the Vatican edition reads *to be able to produce* [posse producere] in place of *producing* [producere], which if the reading of the Vatican edition here is retained, one must add, together with codex K, *to be able* [posse] after *it does not follow that* [non sequitur quod].
[10] Thus the manuscripts together with edition 1, except codex cc, which with the Vatican edition puts

individual [individua].

[11] From very many codices and edition 1, we have supplied *for that reason* [ideo].

[12] In the body of this question.

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ad *vigoris* potentiae instensionem. Specialiter quaeritur de aequalitate trium personarum in *potentia*, quia etiam specialis difficultas circa potentiam solvenda est, cum in Patre sit potentia activa generandi, quae non est in Filio neque in Spiritu sancto; similiter est iudicandum de potentia spirandi, quae non est in Spiritu sancto. Ex hac difficultate sumta sunt omnia argumenta ad oppositum, quae tamen iam supra d. 7. q. 3 et 4. fere soluta sunt. Fundamentum huius solutionis est distinctio potentiae in corp. posita, scil. in potentiam *essentialem* et *notionalem* (quae in solut. ad 1. vocatur *potentia in persona*). Illa respicit productionem ad *extra*, quae tribus personis est communis, haec vero productionem ad *intra*, sive potentiam generandi in Patre et spirandi in Patre et Filio. Potest quidem *potentia* et *omnipotentia* sumi in sensu largo pro qualibet potentia productiva, sive producat *ad intra* sive *ad extra*; attamen *proprie* sub *omnipotentia* non intelligitur nisi potentia *essentialis*. Ad solvendam obiectionem, quod generare in Deo sit *simpliciter* potentia, quae non convenit Filio et Spiritu sancto, bene observat Alex. Hal. (loc. infra cit. ad 1.): « Dissimiliter est generare in homine et in Deo, quia in divinis ipsum generare est de tota substantia, non de parte, et propter hoc in divinis eadem est substantia. In homine autem non est sic; non enim fit generatio de tota substantia, sed per decisionem de parte. Unde ibi non est omnino eadem substantia patris et filii, licet eadem sit forma specifica: et propter hoc in generatione, qua homo generat hominem, *multiplicatur substantia et relatio*. Et ideo in homine est generare *posse quid* et *ad aliquid*; *posse quid* dicit per multiplicationem substantiae, *posse ad aliquid* per multiplicationem relationis. In divinis autem in generatione non multiplicatur substantia, sed solum relatio; et propter hoc generare posse in divinis non est *posse quid*, sed *posse ad aliquid* ». His positis, intelligitur solutio eiusdem Alexandri a

as regards the intensity [intensionem] of the *vigor* of the power. In particular it is asked of the equality of the Three Person in *power*, because the special difficulty about power is to be solved too, since in the Father there is the active power of generating, which is not in the Son nor in the Holy Spirit; similarly one must judge of the power of spirating, which is not in the Holy Spirit. From this difficulty have been taken all the arguments to the opposite, which, however, have already, nearly been solved above in d. 7, qq. 3 and 4. The fundament of this solution is the distinction of power posited in the body (of the question), namely into *essential* and *notional* power (which in the solution to n. 1 is called *the power in a Person*). The former respects the production *ad extra*, which is common to the Three Persons, but the later the production *ad intra*, or the power of generating in the Father and of spirating in the Father and the Son. Indeed "*power*" and "*omnipotence*" can be taken in the broad sense for any productive power, whether it produces *ad intra* or *ad extra*; however *properly* under "*omnipotence*" there is understood naught but the power of the Essence. To solve the objection, that "to generate" in God is *simply* a power, which does not convene with the Son and the Holy Spirit, Alexander of Hales (loc. cit. in reply to n. 1) rightly observes: « "To generate in man" and "in God" is in a dissimilar manner, because among the divine that "to generate" concerns the whole Substance, not a part, and on this account among the divine it is the same as the Substance. But in man it is not so; for there generation does not come to be from the whole substance, but through the falling-off [decisionem] of a part. Whence there the substance of a father is not entirely the same as (that) of the son, though it is the same in specific form: and on this account in the generation, by which a man generates a man, *substance and*

ad obiectionem: aliqua potentia est in Patre, quae tamen non est in Filio, sic respondentis: « Mutatio est praedicamenti, mutatur enim *quid* in *ad aliquid* ». De ipsa potentia in se agitur infra dd. 42. 43. 44.

relation are multiplied. And for that reason in man there is a *power* [posse] to generate *something* and *according to something* [posse quid et ad aliquid]; *the power (to generate) something* means (to generate) through the multiplication of substance, *the power (to generate) according to something* (means to generate) through the multiplication of relation. However, in generation among the divine the Substance is not multiplied, but only a relation; and on account of this the power to generate among the divine is not a *power (to generate) something*, but a *power (to generate) according to something* ». With these posited, the solution of the same Alexander to the objection is understood: some power is in the Father, which, however, is not in the Son; to which he replies: « It is a change according to predicament, for *(to generate) something* is changed into *(to generate) according to something* ». This power is itself is dealt with below in distinctions 42, 43, and 44.

II. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 21. m. 1. a. 3. — Scot., de hac et seq. hic q. unic; Report., hic q. 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2; S. I. q. 42. a. 6. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. hic a. 5; de hac et seq. q. S. p. I. tr. 11. q. 47.m. 3. partic. 1-3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., de hac et seq. hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., de hac et seq. S. a. 70. q. 2. n. 41-63. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic. q. unic.

II. Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 21, m. 1, a. 3. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, on this and the following question, here in q. sole; Reporatio., here in qq. 1 and 2. — St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 1. 2; Summa., I, q. 42, a. 6. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), on this and the following question, here in a. 5; on this and the following question, Summa., p. I, tr. 11, q. 47, m. 3, partic. 1-3. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, on this and the following question, here in q. 1. — Giles the Roman, here in 1, princ., q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, on this and the following question, Summa., a. 70, q. 2, n. 41-63. — Durandus, here in q. 1. — Dionysius Carthusian, here in q. 1. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. unic.

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XX.

ARTICULUS I.

Quaestio II.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 370-371.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

QUAESTIO II.

Utrum in divinis personis sit aequalitas quantum ad intensionem potentiae.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit aequalitas quantum ad intensionem potentiae. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Nihil est potentius sua virtute; sed Christus est *Dei virtus*:[1] ergo Pater non est potentior Filio; similiter pari ratione nec Filius Spiritu sancto.

2. Item, substantiae aeque nobilis[2] aeque nobilis et excellens est potentia; sed substantia est aeque nobilis in Filio ut in Patre, ergo et potentia aequae nobilis: ergo nihil potentius potest Pater quam Filius.

3. Item, ea potentia, qua potest quis supra infinitam et summam distantiam, nihil potentius; sed potentia Verbi potest supra infinitam et summam distantiam, quae est inter ens et non ens, quia *omnia per ipsum facta sunt*:[3] ergo etc.

& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XX

ARTICLE I

Question 2

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 370-371.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUESTION 2

Whether among the Divine Persons there is equality as much as regards the intensity of power.

Second there is asked, whether among the divine there is equality as much as regards the intensity [intensionem] of power. And that (it is) so, seems in this manner:

1. Nothing is more potent than its own virtue; but Christ is the *Virtue of God*:[1] therefore the Father is not more potent than the Son; similarly, for an equal reason, neither the Son than the Holy Spirit.

2. Likewise, of an equally noble[2] substance there is an equally noble and excellent power: but there is in the Son a Substance equally noble as (the One) in the Father, therefore also a power equally noble: therefore the Father can (do) nothing more powerfully than the Son.

3. Likewise, than that power, by which one can (act) over an infinite and most high distance, nothing (is) more potent; but the power of the Word can (act) over the infinite and most high distance, which is between (something) being [ens] and not being [non ens], because *through Him all (things) were made*:[3] ergo etc..

4. Item, ea potentia, cui nihil potest resistere nec aliquid potest eam retardare, nihil est potentius; sed potentiam Filii nihil potest retardare nec aliquid potest ei resistere, quia subito facit et libere, Psalmus:[4] *Dixit et facta sunt*: ergo etc.

4. Likewise, than that power, which nothing can resist nor anything can retard, nothing is more potent: but nothing can retard the power of the Son, nor can anything resist it, because it works suddenly and freely, (as) the Psalm (says):[4] *He spoke and they were made*: ergo etc..

Contra: 1. Potentior est potentia in eo qui solum potest agere, quam in eo qui[5] agere et pati; sed in Patre est solum agere, in Filio agere et pati: ergo etc.

On the contrary: 1. More potent is the power in that which can only act, than in that which (can)[5] act and suffer; but in the Father there is only acting, in the Son acting and suffering: ergo etc..

2. Item, potentius aliquid potest quod est primum principium, quam quod non est primum, quia « omnis causa primaria plus influit quam secunda »;[6] sed Pater est primum principium: ergo unum et idem potentius Pater quam Filius.

2. Likewise, anything which is a first principle is more potent, that that which is not a first (principle), because « every primary cause influences [influit] more than a second (cause) »;[6] but the Father is a first principle: therefore the one and same Father (is) more potent than the Son.

3. Item, potentius potest qui habet potentiam a se, quam qui ab alio; qui enim aliquid a se habet multo melius habet, quam qui ab alio accipit:[7] ergo cum Filius habeat posse a Patre, Pater autem per se et a se, ergo etc.

3. Likewise, one can act in a more potent manner who has power from himself [a se], that one who (has it) from another; for he who has anything from himself has it in a much better manner, than he who accepts it from another:[7] therefore since the Son has (His) 'being able' [posse] from the Father, but the Father (has it) through Himself and from Himself, ergo etc..

4. Item, plus potest aliquis, qui potest et per se et per alium, quam qui tantum per se; sed Pater potest operari per Filium, Spiritus sanctus non potest per Filium, nec etiam ipse Filius proprie loquendo: ergo etc.

4. Likewise, anyone can (do) more, who can (act) both through himself and through another, than the one who (can act) only through himself; but the Father can work through the Son, the Holy Spirit cannot (work) through the Son, nor (can) even the Son Himself, properly speaking: ergo etc..

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[1] I. Cor. 1, 24. — Paulo ante post *virtute* codd. aa bb addunt *nec extensive nec intensive*.
[2] In lectione, quae in mss. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 communior est, ponitur genitivus *nobilis* pro *nobili*, quod habet Vat. Paulo infra post *ergo et potentia* cod. bb adiungit *est*.
[3] Ioan. 1, 3.
[4] 148, 5. — Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis autem codd. cum ed. 1 reluctantibus, *patet quia* loco *Psalmus*.
[5] Supple cum cod. V *potest*. Habentur hic in codicibus diversae lectiones: sic in aliquibus ut A T et in ed. 1 post *quam* omittitur *in eo*, immo inveniuntur mss. ut Z, in quibus desunt verba *in eo qui*. Paulo infra post *Filio* cod. X addit *est*, e contra plures codd. ut S T Y cum ed. 1 omittunt *agere et*.
[6] Libr. de Causis, propos. 1: Omnis causa primaria plus est influens supra causatum suum quam causa universalis secunda. — Paulo ante post *quod non* in edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 et in pluribus mss. ut T V Y omittitur *est*.
[7] Praestamus antiquam lectionem ed. 1 et mss.,

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[1] 1 Cor. 1:24. — A little before this, after *than its own virtue* [sua virtute], codices aa and bb add *neither extensively nor intensively* [extensive nec intensive].
[2] In the reading (accepted in the text), which among the manuscripts together with editions 1, 2 and 3 is more common, there is put the genitive *noble* [nobilis] instead of the ablative, which the Vatican edition has. A little below this, codex bb reads *therefore there is also a power* [ergo et potentia est] for *therefore also a power* [ergo et potentia].
[3] Jn 1:3.
[4] Psalm 148:5. — The Vatican edition, together with codex cc, but with the other codices together with edition 1 striving against this, has *it is clear because* [patet quia] for *(as) the Psalm (says)* [Psalmus].
[5] Supply together with codex V *can* [potest]. Here in the codices diverse readings are had: thus in some, such as A and T and in edition 1, there is omitted the second *in that* [in eo], nay there are found manuscripts, such as Z, in which the words *in that*

quorum tamen aliqui ut A G P Q habent *recipit* loco *accipit*, dum Vat. legit *quam si ab alio recipiat*. Paulo supra cod. Y post *ab alio* addit *accipit*, qui et dein cum aliquibus mss. ut V X loco *a se* ponit *per se*, cod. T autem *a se et per se*, quae lectio subnexis conformior est.

which [in eo qui] are omitted. A little below this, after *in the Son* [in Filio], codex X ads *there is* [est], and contrariwise very many codices, such as S T Y together with edition 1, omit *acting and* [agere et].

[6] Book on Causes, proposition 1: Every primary cause is more an influence [influens] over its own caused, that a second universal cause. — A little before this, after *that that which* [quam quod non], there is omittedin editins 1, 2, 3, and 6, and in very many manuscripts, such as T V and Y, *is* [est].

[7] We present the ancient reading of edition 1 and the manuscripts, some of which, however, such as A G P and Q, have *receives* [recipit] for *accepts* [accipit], while the Vatican edition reads *than if he receive it from another* [quam si ab alio recipiat]. A little above this codex Y reads *than one who accepts it from another* [quam qui ab alio accipit], which also with some manuscripts, such as V and X, in place of the second *from himself* [a se], has *through himself* [per se], but codex T reads *from himself and through himself* [a se et per se], which reading is more conformable to the subjoined.

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CONCLUSIO.

Potentia in divinis personis est aeque intensa.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod potentia in Patre et Filio est aeque intensa, quia in utroque summa est et aeque nobilis, quia in utroque una per naturam non degenerans[1] — similiter et in Spiritu sancto — et hoc, loquendo de Filio secundum divinam naturam, secundum quam est aequalis Patri.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod Filius potest pati; dicendum, quod istud[2] non est secundum potentiam divinam, sed secundum infirmitatem humanam; et secundum illam inferior est Patre et minus potens; secundum autem divinam non potest pati, sicut nec Pater.

2. Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur, quod primum principium magis potest; dicendum, quod *primum* et[3] *principium* aut solum dicit *ordinem*, aut *substantialem differentiam*. Si solum *ordinem*, cum unum et idem sit utrobique, non est potentius hic quam ibi. Si autem *differentiam substantialem* cum ordine, sic verum est, quod potentius est primum quam secundum, quia secundum addit aliquid supra primum, quod dum facit magis[4] compositum, magis reddit limitatum,

CONCLUSION

The power in the Divine Persons is equally intense.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that the power in the Father and the Son is equally intense [intensa], because in Each it is most high and equally noble, because (it is) one in Each, not degenerating through nature[1] — similarly also in the Holy Spirit — and this, speaking of the Son according to the Divine Nature, according to which He is equal to the Father.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that the Son can suffer; it must be said, that that (ability)[2] of His is not according to the divine power, but according to (His) human infirmity; and according to that He is inferior to the Father and less potent; but according to the Divine (Nature) He cannot suffer, just as neither (can) the Father.

2. To that which is objected second, that a first principle can (do) more; it must be said, that "*first*" and[3] "*beginning*" [principium] either means only an "*order*", or a "*substantial difference*". If only an "*order*", since it is one and the same on both sides, it not more potent here than there. But if a "*substantial difference*" with order, in this manner it is true, that a first (principle) is more potent than a second (principle), because the second adds something to the

et ita minus potens.

first, which while it makes it more[4] composite, renders it more limited, and thus less potent.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur tertio, iam solutum est: quia *habere ab alio*, hoc est aut differente *substantialiter*, aut *personaliter*. Si *substantialiter*, sic[5] verum est, quia cum habeat ab alio per essentiam, non habet essentialiter, sed participatione; sed quanto habet ab *alio personaliter*, eodem tamen essentialiter, tunc habet aeque nobiliter, quia totaliter et essentialiter. Unde Ioannis quinto:[6] *Sicut Pater habet vitam in semetipso, sic dedit Filio* etc.

3. To that which is objected third, it has already been solves: because "*to have from another*", this is either by (something) differing *substantially*, or *personally*. If *substantially*, it is thus[5] true, because since he has it from another through (its) essence, he does not have it essentially, but by participation; but as much as he has it from *another personally*, yet by the same essentially, then he has it in an equally noble manner, because totally and essentially. Whence in the fifth (chapter of the Gospel of St.) John (there is said):[6] *Just as the Father has life in Himself, so has He given to the Son* etc..

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur quarto, quod Pater potest per se[7] et per alium; dicendum, quod *posse per alium* est dupliciter: aut per aliam *causam inferiorem* simul agentem, aut per aliam *personam*. Primo modo potentius est posse per se et per alium, quam per se tantum; quia posse per alium dicit dominium, et ita potestatem; sed posse per alium ut[8] per *personam* consubstantialem non dicit dominum, sed tantum auctoritatem. Auctoritas autem non dicit maioritatem, sed solum dicit originem, sicut *posse ab alio* et *non ab alio* non dicit minoritatem in potentia,[9] sed solum subauctoritatem et originem; et sic intelligendum in proposito de *posse per alium* et *non posse per alium*.

4. To that which is objected fourth, that the Father can (act) through Himself[7] and through Another; it must be said that "*to be able (to act) through another*" is in a twofold manner: either through another *inferior cause* acting together (with it), or through another *person*. In the first manner it is more potent to be able (to act) through oneself and through another, than through oneself only; because "to be able (to act) through another" means a dominion, and thus power; but "to be able (to act) through another" as[8] through a consubstantial *person* does not mean a dominion, but only an authorship [auctoritas]. But "authorship" does not mean "to be greater" [maioritatem], but only means an origin, just as "*to be able (to act) by another* and *not by another*" does not mean "to be lesser" [minoritatem] in power,[9] but only a subauthorship and origin; and in this manner must it be understood in the proposed concerning "*to be able (to act) through another*" and "*to not be able to act through another*".

SCHOLION.

I. De hac quaestione non invenimus speciatim tractantem nisi Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica a. 2. Alex. Hal. autem eadem et alia obiecta solvit S. p. I. q. 47. m. 2. 3. Quoad 2. opposit. inter alia dicit: « Descensus causarum creatarum est secundum maiorem et minorem distantiam a causa prima, propter quod, secundum quod magis descendunt, minus communicant virtutem primae causae; non sic in divinis, licet sit ibi

SCHOLIUM

I. Of this question we do not find any special treatment except in (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. sole, a. 2. Alexander of Hales, however, solves the same and other objections in <u>Summa</u>., p. I, q. 47, m. 2 and 3. In regard to the 2 nd opposed argument, he says among other things: « The descending of created causes is according to (their) greater and lesser distance from the First Cause, on which

ordo natura; sunt enim omnino idem secundum substantia; unde in illis non potest esse differentia virtutis vel potentiae ».

account, according to which they descend more, they communicate less of the virtue of the First Cause; not so (is it) among the divine, though There there is an order according to Nature; for They are entirely the Same according to substance; whence among Them there cannot be a difference of virtue and/or of power ».

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[1] Alludit ad verba Hilarii supra d. XIX. p. I.c. 4. allegata et ibid dub. 11. explicata. — Paulo infra post *Spiritu sancto* Vat. cum cod. cc adiungit *est*.
[2] Aliqui cod. ut Y Z cum ed. 1 *illud*. Mox post *potentiam* in cod. bb additur *vel naturam*.
[3] Ex plurimis mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 supplevimus particularm *et*, quae a cod. V etiam paulo supra, ubi eadem propositio occurrit, minus bene ponitur, quia ibi est tantum repetitio obiectionis, hic autem ipsius resolutio. [Trans. note: cfr. hic q. 2, 3. arg. fundamenti et nota 2.]
[4] Cod. T hic addit *est*, ac post *compositum* particulam *et*; lectio non spernenda. — Cfr. supra pag. 169, nota 4.
[5] Aliqui codd. ut X Z cum ed. 1 *tunc*. Mox post *habeat ab alio* in cod. X additur *differente ab alio*, et paulo infra verbo *personaliter* praefigitur *differente*. Cod Y *per participationem* pro *participatione*.
[6] Vers. 26, in quo textu Vulgata cum Vat. post *dedit* adiungit *et*, sed contra mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6.
[7] In pluribus codd. ut A I T Y Z et ed. 1 deest *per se et*. Mox Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 post primum *aut per* substituit *aliquam* loco *aliam*.
[8] Fide plurium mss. ut F G H M Y ee supplevimus *ut*, loco cuius codd. aa bb post *personam* addunt *scilicet*. Paulo ante cod. Y post *quia posse* adiungit *sic*, et dein ed. 1 omittit *ita*.
[9] Supple: in eo qui potest ab alio. Pauci codd. ut M N cum ed. 1 post *minoritatem* addunt *vel maioritatem*, unus alterve codex autem ut S ponit *maioritatem* loco *minoritatem*.

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[1] An allusion to the words of (St.) Hilary (of Poitiers), cited above in Distinction XIX, p. I, ch. 4, and explained (by St. Bonaventure in his Commnentary) on dubium 11, of that distinction. — A little below this, the Vatican edition together with codex cc reads *similarly also is it in the Holy Spirit* [similiter et in Spiritu sancto est].
[2] Some codices, such as Y and Z, together with edition 1, read *that (ability)* [illud] for *that (ability) of His* [istud]. Next after *divine power* [potentiam divinam] in codex bb there is added *and/or Nature* [vel naturam].
[3] From very many manuscripts and editions 1, 2, and 3, we have supplied the particle *and* [et], which is put less well by codex V also a little above this, where the same proposition occurs, because above there is only a repetition of the objection, but here its resolution. [Trans. Note. here principium is rendered *beginning* rather than as *principle*, according to the citation of Aristotle, made in the following question, fundament 3 and its footnote 2, on p. 372.]
[4] Codex T adds reads *while it works more and makes (it) composite and* etc. [dum facit magis compositum et]; a reading not to be spurned. — Cf. above d. 8, p. II, a. sole, q. 2, page 169, footnote 4.
[5] Some codices, such as X and Z, together with edition 1, have *then* [tunc]. Next after *since he has it from another* [cum habeat ab alio] in codex X there is inserted *differing from another* [differente ab alio], and a little below this, there is placed *differing* [differing] before *personally* [personaliter]. Codex Y reads *through participation* [per participationem] for *by participation* [participatione].
[6] Verse 26, in which text the Vulgate, together with the Vatican edition, after *He has given* [dedit] there is added *also* [et], but contrary to the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 and 6.
[7] In all the codices, such as A I T Y Z, and edition 1, there is lacking *through Himself and* [per se et]. Next the Vatican edition, contrary to nearly all the codices and edition 1, after *either through* [aut per] reads *some* [aliqua] for *another* [aliam].
[8] Trusting in very many manuscripts, such as F G H M Y and ee, we have supplied *as* [ut], in place of which codices aa and bb read *that this through a consubstantial person* [per personam scilicet consubstantialem]. A little before this codex Y, after *because to be able* [quia posse], adds *in this manner* [sic], and then edition 1 omits *thus* [et].
[9] Supply: in the one which can (act) by another. A few codices, such as M and N, together with edition 1, after *"to be lesser"* [minoritatem] add *and/or "to be greater"* [maioritatem], but one or the other codex, such as S, puts *"to be greater"* [maioritatem]

in place of *“to be lesser”* [minoritatem].

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XX.

ARTICULUS II.

Quaestio I.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 371-373.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

ARTICULUS II.

De ordine in divinis.

Consequenter est quaestio secundo loco de secundo articulo, scilicet[10] utrum in divinis sit ordo. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo, quaeritur, utrum ordo sit ibi[11] ponendus.
Secundo, utrum ordo naturae.

[10] In Vat. et recentiore cod. cc desideratur *scilicet*.
[11] Ex mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *ibi* loco *in divinis*, quod et paulo infra post *Secundo, utrum* Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 addit.

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XX

ARTICLE II

Question 1

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 371-373.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

ARTICLE II

On order among the divine.

Consequently, there is the question in the second place concerning the second article, that is,[10] whether among the divine there is an order.

First, there is asked, whether an order is to be posited There.[11]
Second, whether (it is) an order of nature.

[10] In the Vatican edition 1 and the more recent codex cc there is wanting *that is* [scilicet].
[11] From the manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *There* [ibi] in place of *among the divine* [in divinis], which the Vatican edition, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, adds a little below this after *Second, whether* [Secundo, utrum].

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum in divinis sit ratio ordinis.

QUO IN DIVINIS sit ordo, ostenditur:

1. Primo per Augustinum contra Maximinum:[1] « Cum dicitur Filius a Patre, non significatur inaequalitas substantiae, sed ordo naturae ».

2. Item, hoc videtur auctoritate Ecclesiae, quia Ecclesia nominationem Trinitatis exprimit ordinate. Dicitur enim in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti, et hic ordo nunquam mutatur: ergo etc.

3. Item, principium dicit rationem ordinis. « Primum enim et principium, dicit Philosophus,[2] idem dico »; sed in divinis Pater est principium Filii, ergo primus. Sed ubi hoc, ibi ordo: ergo etc.

4. Item, ordo dicit rationem completi *esse* et *boni* — « *esse* enim, ut dicit Boethius,[3] est quod ordinem retinet servatque naturam »; similiter et *bonum* — sed in divinis perfectissime est ratio *esse* et *boni*: ergo est ibi ratio ordinis.

5. Item, ubicumque sunt plures, inter quos non est ordo, sunt inordinati; sed in divinis personis est pluralitas: ergo si non est ibi ordo, est inordinatio et confusio; sed inordinatio et confusio repugnat[4] divinis; ergo est ibi ordo.

CONTRA: 1. Eusebius:[5] « In divinis est numerus, sed non ordo ».

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ex *ratione ordinis*. Augustinus de civitate Dei:[6] « Ordo est parium dispariumque sua unicuique tribuens loca dispositio »; sed in divinis non est distinctio locorum: ergo etc.

QUESTION 1

Whether among the divine there is a reckoning of order.

THAT AMONG THE DIVINE there is an order, is shown:

1. First through (St.) Augustine (in his work) Against Maximinus:[1] « When the Son is said (to be) from the Father [a Patre], there is not signified an inequality of substance, but an order of nature ».

2. Likewise, this seems by the authority of the Church, because the Church expresses the naming of the Trinity in an ordered manner [ordinate]. For there is said "In the Name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit", and this order is never changed: ergo etc..

3. Likewise, "beginning" [principium] means a reckoning of order. « For "first" and "beginning" », says the Philosopher,[2] « I say (are) the same »; but among the divine the Father is the beginning of the Son, therefore the First (Person). But where this (is), there is an order: ergo etc..

4. Likewise, "order" means a complete reckoning of *'being'* and *the good* — « for '*being*' », as (St. Severinus) Boethius[3] says, « is that which retains order and preserves [servare] the nature »; similarly also *the good* — but among the divine there is in a most perfect manner a reckoning of *'being'* and of *the good*: therefore there is a reckoning of order There.

5. Likewise, wheresoever there are many, among which there is not an order, they are inordinate; but among the Divine Persons there is a plurality: therefore if there is not an order There, there is inordinacy [inordinatio] and confusion; but inordinacy and confusion is[4] repugnant to the divine; therefore there in an order There.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. (St.) Eusebius (of Vercelli says):[5] « Among the divine there is number, but not order ».

2. Likewise, this very (thing) seems from the *reckoning of order*. (St.) Augustine (says in his work) On the City of God:[6] « An "order" is a disposition of equals and disparates [parium dispariumque], granting to each

one their own places »; but among the divine three is no distinction of places: ergo etc..

3. Item, ordo contrariatur *simultati*,[7] ergo ubi est ordo, non est omnimoda simultas; sed ubi non est omnimoda simultas, non est perfecta aequalitas: ergo cum in divinis sit omnimoda et perfecta aequalitas, nullus est ibi ordo.

3. Likewise, "order" is the contrary of *togetherness* [contrariatur simultati],[7] therefore, where there is an order, there is not an omnimodal togetherness; but where is not an omnimodal togetherness, there is not a perfect equality: therefore since among the divine there is an omnimodal and perfect equality, there is no order There.

4. Item, si ordo est in divinis, aut est quid *essentiale*, aut *notionale*. Non *essentiale*, quia ubi ordo, ibi distinctio; in divinis autem non est distinctio secundum essentiam: ergo etc. Nec quid *notionale*, quoniam idem est notio et proprietas, sed ordo nullius personae est proprietas:[8] ergo etc.

4. Likewise, if there is order among the divine, either it is something *essential*, or *notional*. Not *essential*, because where (there is) order, there (is) distinction; but among the divine there is no distinction according to the Essence: ergo etc.. Nor (is it) something *notional*, since the same is notion and property, but "order" is the property of no Person:[8] ergo etc..

5. Item, ubi est ordo, ibi est dependentia et inclinatio; nihil enim ordinatur ad aliquid, nisi ad illud habeat inclinationem; in divinis autem nulla est dependentia: ergo ibi nullus omnino ordo.[9]

5. Likewise, where there is order, there is dependence and inclination; for nothing is ordered to anything, unless it has an inclination to it; but among the divine there is no dependence: therefore (there is) entirely no order There.[9]

6. Item, ordo praesupponit numerum; sed in divinis non cadit differentiam secundum numerum, ut ostensum est supra:[10] ergo nec ordo.

6. Likewise, order presupposes number; but among the divine there occurs no difference according to number, as has been shown above:[10] therefore neither order.

CONCLUSIO.

Ordo ponendus est in divinis, sed solummodo ordo secundum originem.

CONCLUSION

"Order" is to be posited among the divine, but an order only according to origin.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod triplex est ordo, scilicet secundum *positionem*, secundum *antecessionem* et secundum *originem*.

Ordo secundum *positionem* dicitur aliquorum, quorum unum est superius, aliud inferius. Et hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel in loco, vel in dignitate. Et hic ordo non cadit in divinis, sicut ostendit prima ratio sumta ab Eusebio, et secunda sumta ab Augustino, sicut patet.

Ordo vero secundum *antecessionem* dicitur esse eorum, quorum unum prius est, alterum vero posterius; et hoc dicitur dupliciter: aut quia antecedit duratione sive tempore, aut prius naturali intelligentia sive cognitione. Et hic ordo non est in divinis,

I respond: It must be said, that "order" is threefold, namely, according to *position*, according to *antecedence* [antecessionem] and according to *origin*.

"Order" according to *position* is said of any, one of which is the superior, another the inferior. And this can be in a twofold manner: either in a place, and/or in dignity. And this "order" does not occur among the divine, just as the first reason taken from (St.) Eusebius shows, and the second taken from (St.) Augustine, just as it clear.

However, "order" according to antecedence is said to be of those, one of which is prior, but the other of the two posterior; and this is said in a twofold manner: either because it goes before [antecedit] in duration or time, or (is) prior in the understanding of its

sicut probat ratio tertia, quia hic ordo tollit aequalitatem et simultatem, quorum utrumque perfecte est in divinis.

nature [naturali intelligentia] or in cognition. And this "order" is not among the divine, just as the third reason proves, because this "order" takes away "equality" and "simultaneity", each of which is perfectly among the Divine (Persons).

Ordo autem secundum *originem* sive secundum emanationem est producentis ad productum.[11] Et iste ordo est in divinis, quia ibi est ordo principii et . . .

But "order" according to *origin* or according to an emanation is of one producing to one produced.[11] And that order is among the divine, because there is an order of beginning and . . .

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[1] Libr. II. c. 14. n. 8. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. circa finem. — Ex cod. T posuimus *contra* loco *ad*. Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, post *Maximinum* addit *ubi dicit*.
[2] Libr. I. Poster. c. 2. — Totum hoc tertium argumentum abest a Vat. et cod. cc, exstat tamen in aliis mss. et ed. 1.
[3] Libr. IV. de Consol. Prosa 2.
[4] Cod. V *repugnant*.
[5] Colligitur ex libro S. Eusebii Vercellens. de Trin. Confessione, ubi n. 8. ait: « Haec ergo sancta Trinitas, quae unus est et verus Deus, non recedit a numero nec capitur numero. In relatione enim personarum numerus cernitur. In divinitatis vero substantia quid innumeratum sit, non comprehenditur ». Et ibid. n. 10: « Nec tamen tres istae personae separabiles existimandae sunt, cum nulla ante aliam, nulla post aliam, nulla sine alia vel exstitisse vel quidpiam operasse aliquando credatur ».
[6] Libr. XIX. c. 13. n. 1, ubi Vat. falso *partium disparium* loco *parium dispariumque*. Mox cod V *dispositio* pro *distinctio*.
[7] Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Priori et Simul.
[8] Cod. X, addito in principio huius argumenti tertio disiunctionis membro, scil *aut personale*, hic adiungit *Item non personale, quia ordo est communis, persona non*. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 46. m. 1. in simili obiectione tria membra ponit, scil *aut est essentia aut persona aut notio*, et respectu secundi membri ait: « Item nec potest dici, quod iste ordo sit persona, immo est personarum, quia dicit habitudinem personarum ad personas ». Et B. Albert., S. p. I. tract. 9. q. 41. m. 2. a. 1. tria obiectionis membra proferens, de secundo ait: « Nec (ordo dicit) personam: ordo enim personarum est, persona autem personarum non est; sicut non sunt ordinata ordo, sed ordo est ordinatorum ». Attamen iam per se manifestum est, quod *ordo* non dicit *personam*; unde hoc divisionis membrum omitti potuit; vel dic, quod sub *notionali* comprehenditur *personale*.
[9] Nonnulli codd. ut V Z praemittunt verbum *est*.
[10] Dist. 19. p. II. q. 4.
[11] In codd. aa bb additur *et hoc dupliciter: vel secundum quod unum est ab alio essentialiter, et sic non est in divinis, sed solum in his inferioribus; vel secundum quod unum est ab alio personaliter tantum*.

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[1] Book II, ch. 14, n. 8. See here the text of Master (Peter), ch. 3, near the end. — From codex T we put *(in his work) Against* [contra] in place of *(in his letter) To* [ad]. The Vatican edition, with the manuscripts and edition 1 striving against this, after *Maximinus* [Maximinum] adds *where he says* [ubi dicit].
[2] Posterior Analytics, Bk. II, ch. 2. — The whole of this third argument is absent from the Vatican edition and codex cc, yet it is extant in the other manuscripts and edition 1.
[3] On the Consolation of Philosphy, Bk. IV, Discourse 2.
[4] Codex V has *are repugnant* [repugnant].
[5] This is gathered from St. Eusebius of Vercelli's, On the Confession of the Trinity, where in n. 8 he says: « Therefore, this Holy Trinity, which is the One, True god, does not withdraw [recedit] from number nor is grasped by number. For in the relation of the Persons a number is discerned [cernitur]. But in the substance of the Divinity what is enumerated, is not comprehended ». And ibid., n. 10: « Nor yet are the Three Persons to be estimated separables, since None before Another, None after Another, None without Another is believed either to have existed and/or indeed to have at any time worked ».
[6] Book IXI, ch. 13, n. 1, where the Vatican edition falsely reads *of parts of disparates* [partium disparium] in place of *of equals and of disparates* [parium et dispariumque]. Next codex V reads *disposition* [dispositio] for *distinction* [distinctio].
[7] Cf. Aristotle, On the Predicaments, ch. "On Before and Together".
[8] Codex X, having added at the beginning of this argument a third member of the distinction, namely *or personal* [aut personale], here adds *Likewise, non personal, because order is common, person not* [Item non personale, quia ordo est communis, persona non.] Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 46, m. 1, in a similar objection posits three members, namely *either it is the essence, or a Person, or a notion* [aut est essentia aut persona aut notio], and in respect of the second member says: « Likewise, neither can it be said, that that order is a Person, nay it its of the Persons, because it means a habitude of the Persons to the Persons ». And Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Summa., p. I, tract 9, q. 41, m. 2, a. 1, offering three members of the objection, says of the second: « Neither (does order mean) a Person: for the order is of the Persons, but a Person is not of the Persons; just as (things) ordered are not an order,

but an order is of (things) ordered ». Nevertheless, it has already been manifested through itself, that *order* does not mean *person*; whence he could have omitted this division; and or said, that the *personal* is meant under the *notional*.

[9] Not a few codices, such as V and Z, read *there is entirely no order There* [ibi nullus omnino est ordo].

[10] Distinction 19, p. II, q. 4.

[11] In codices aa and bb there is added *and this in a twofold manner: either according to which one is from another essentially, and in this manner it is not among the divine, but only among these inferiors; and/or according to which one is from another only personally* [et hoc dupliciter: vel secundum quod unum est ab alio essentialiter, et sic non est in divinis, sed solum in his inferioribus; vel secundum quod unum est ab alio personaliter tantum.].

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principati, sive producentis et producti, et hunc ordinem esse in divinis probant rationes primae.

begun There, or of One producing and One produced, and the first reasons prove that this "order" is among the Divine (Persons).

4. Quod obiicitur quarto, quod ordo non est quid notionale nec essentiale;[1] dicendum, quod est notionale; sed notionem contingit dupliciter significare: aut sub *propria* ratione, ut cum dicitur generatio; aut sub *communi* ratione, communitate, inquam, rationis, ut cum dicitur *ordo*,[2] *notio*, *proprietas* — sicut individuum est communis intentio — et sub hac communitate non distinguit, tamen in suis inferioribus distinctionem supponit.

4. Because it is objected fourth, that the order (There) is not something notional nor essential;[1] it must be said, that it is notional; but it happens that "notion" signifies in a twofold manner: either under a *proper* reckoning, as when "generation" is said (to be a notion); or under a *common* reckoning, by a community, I say, of reckoning, as when there is said *order*,[2] *notion*, *property* — just as "individual" is a common intention — and under this community it does not distinguish, yet among its inferiors it does suppose distinction.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur: ubi est ordo, ibi dependentia; dicendum, quod ordo importat habitudinem, et quia habitudo in creaturis ratione imperfectionis dicit dependentiam, ideo in creaturis importat dependentiam; in divinis autem habitudo[3] solum ponit comparationem et connexionem et nullam dependentiam et inclinationem: ideo etc.

5. To that which is objected: where there is order, there is dependence; it must be said, that "order" conveys habitude, and because "habitude" in creatures according to the reckoning of imperfection means "dependence", for that reason in creatures it conveys dependence; but among the divine "habitude"[3] only posits a comparison and connection, an no dependence and inclination: for that reason etc..

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod ordo praesupponit numerum; dicendum, quod sicut in divinis numerus distrahit[4] a ratione numeri, quia ibi est distinctio hypostasum tantum, ita ordo a ratione ordinis simpliciter, quia, quamvis ibi sit ordo, non tamen est ibi antecessio, sed solum originis emanatio.

6. To that which is last objected, that order presupposes number; it must be said, that just as among the divine number withdraws [distrahit][4] from the reckoning of number, because There there is only a distinction of Hypostases, thus order from the reckoning of order simply (speaking), because, although there is an order There, yet it is there is no antecedence, but only the

emanation of origin.

Vel aliter dicendum, quod non semper praesupponit distinctionem secundum numerum, nisi intelligatur de ordine locali sive secundum positionem. Nam ordo secundum naturam et secundum naturalem intelligentiam attendtiur inter superius et inferius, inter quae non cadit numerus. Et ita patet illud.

And/or it must be said in another way, that (order) does not always presuppose distinction according to number, unless it is understood of local order or according to position. For an ‘order according to nature’ and ‘according to the understanding of the nature’ is attained between a superior and an inferior, between which there occurs no number. And thus that is clear.

SCHOLION.

I. Richard. a Med. (hic q. 3.) dicit: « Ordo simpliciter importat ordinatorum distinctionem et distinctorum mutuam habitudinem prioris et posterioris gradus. Quamvis autem personae inter se sint distinctae et habeant mutuam habitudinem inter se, gradum tamen prioris et posterioris non habent, quia nulla prior est alia duratione nec dignitate nec etiam secundum naturam ». Unde merito concludit, quod, sicut in divinis non dici debet numerus nisi cum determinatione, scil. numerus personarum, sic non debet dici, quod in divinis est ordo simpliciter, sed cum determinatione, scil. ordo originis, non quo unus sit prior alio, sed quod unus est ab alio. Eandem sententiam Seraphicus, distinctis variis ordinis speciebus, pluribus conclusionibus tuetur et in solut. ad ult. clarius explicat. Quod hic dicit de numeris iam supra d. 19. p. II. q. 4. probatum est.

SCHOLIUM

I. Richard of Middleton (here in q. 3) says: « Order simply (speaking) conveys a distinction of (those) ordered and the mutual habitude of a prior and posterior grade of (those) distinguished. But although the Persons have been distinguished among Themselves and have a mutual habitude among Themselves, yet They do not have a grade of prior and posterior, because None is prior to Another in duration nor in dignity nor even according to the Nature ». Whence he rightly concludes, that, just as among the divine “number” ought not be said, because in the divine there is an order simply (speaking), but with a determination, that is, an order of origin, not by which One is prior to Another, but because One is from Another. The Seraphic (Doctor), having distinguished the various species of order, defends the same sentence with many conclusions and explains it more clearly in the solution to n. 4. What he says here of numbers, has already been proven above in d. 19, p. II, q. 4.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. a. 46. m. 1. — Scot., de hac et seqq. Quodlib. q. 1. et 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3: S. I. q. 42. a. 3. et q. 33. a . 1. ad. 3. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. hic a. 7; S. p. I. tr. 9. q. 41. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. unica. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 52. q. 1. — Durand., de hac et seq. hic a. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. hic q. 2.

II. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, a. 46, m. 1. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, on this and the following questions, Quodlibetals., qq. 1 and 4. — St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 3: Summa. , I, q. 42, a. 3 and q. 33, a. 1, ad. 3. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), on this and the following question, here in a. 7; Summa., p. I, tr. 9, q. 41, m. 2. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. sole, a. 4. — Richard of Middleton, here in q. 3. — Giles the Roman, here in 2nd. princ., q. sole. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 52, q. 1. — Durandus, on this and the following question, here in a. 2. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here in q. 2.

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[1] Plurimi codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 loco *essentiale*

[1] Very many codices, together with editions 1, 2,

ponunt *personale*, quod vel est lapsus librariorum, vel signum, quod hic et in ipsa obiectione tertium divisionis membrum, ut non necessario ennumerandum, omissum est, sicut supra a nobis fide codicis X observantum est. — Paulo ante fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 delevimus *Ad illud*, quod Vat. verbis *quod obiicitur* praefigit. Mox cod. A *notionale* pro *notionem*.

2 In codd. aa bb additur *principium*, cuius mentionem facit et S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. ad 4.

3 Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis tamen codd. cum ed. 1 refragantibus, omittit hic *habitudo* et paulo infra *ideo*.

4 Cod. X *distrahitur*, scilicet numerus in divinis trahitur a sensu proprio ad improprium. Cfr. supra d. 19. p. II. a. 4, et dub. 2.

and 3, in place of *essential* [essentiale] put *personal* [personale], which is either a lapse of the copiests, and/or a sign, that here and in the objection itself the third member of the division has been omitted, as not necessary to be enumerated, just as has been observed by us above, from the testimony of codex X. — A little before this, trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have changed *To that which is objected fourth* [Ad illud quod obiicitur quarto] of the Vatican edition, to *Because it is objected fourth* [Quod obiicitur quarto]. Next codex A has *notionale* [notionale] for *"notion"* [notionem].

2 In codices aa and bb there is added *principle* [principium], mention of which St. Thomas makes, here in q. 1, a. 3, in reply to n. 4.

3 The Vatican edition, together with codex cc, breaking, however, with the other codices together with edition 1, omits here *"habitude"* [habitudo] and a little below this *for that reason* [ideo].

4 Codex X reads *is withdrawn* [distrahitur], that is "number" among the divine is drawn away from its proper sense to an improper one. Cf. above d. 19, p. II, a. 4, and dubium 2.

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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XX.

ARTICULUS II.

Quaestio II.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 373-375.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XX

ARTICLE II

Question 2

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 373-375.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUAESTIO II.

Utrum in divinis sit ordo naturae.

SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum in divinis sit ordo naturae. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per Augustinum, qui dicit in littera,[5] quod « cum dicitur Filius a Patre, non dicitur inaequalitas substantiae, sed ordo naturae ».

2. Item, ubi est naturalis origo, ibi est naturalis ordo: sed in divinis est naturalis origo, ergo et naturalis ordo: ergo est ibi ordo naturae.

3. Item, ubi est causa et effectus, ibi est prius et posterius; sed ubicumque hoc, ibi est[6] ordo naturae: ergo cum in divinis contingat reperire causam et effectum, sicut dicit Chrysostomus super principium ad Hebraeos,[7] et Damascenus primo libro, capitulo octavo: « Pater est causa Filii », patet etc.

CONTRA: 1. Cuiuscumque est ordo, ipsum ordinatur: ergo si in divinis est ordo naturae, natura ordinatur; sed quod ordinatur distinguitur et numeratur:[8] ergo in divinis natura distinguitur et numeratur; sed hoc falsum: ergo etc.

2. Item,.in divinis[9] idem est natura et essentia, quia *natura* nomen est essentiale; sed in divinis nullo modo ponitur ordo essentiae: ergo nec naturae.

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[5] Hic, c. 3. circa finem.
[6] In pluribus mss. ut A T V X et ed. 1 omittur *est*.
[7] Homil. 2. n. 2: Si enim Pater eius est causa et auctor, multo magis eorum quae per ipsum facta sunt. — Verba Ioan. Damasc. de Fide orthodox. loc. cit. sunt: Pater naturaliter Filii causa est.
[8] Vat. cum paucis codd. addit *si hoc*. Paulo infra post *sed hoc* in aliquibus mss. ut V X Z adiungitur *est*.
[9] In plurimis codd. et ed. 1 deest *in divinis*, sed propter rationem additam certe supplendem.

QUESTION 2

Whether among the divine there is an order of nature.

SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether among the divine there is an order of nature. And that (it is) so, seems:

1. Through (St.) Augustine, who says in the text (of Master Peter),[5] that « when the Son is said (to be) from the Father, there is not meant an inequality of substance, but an order of nature ».

2. Likewise, where (there) is a natural origin, there is a natural order: but among the divine there is a natural origin, therefore also a natural order: therefore there is an order of nature.

3. Likewise, where (there) is cause and effect, there is a prior and a posterior; but wheresoever this, there is[6] an order of nature: therefore since among the divine it happens that one finds cause and effect, just as (St. John) Chrysostom says on the first (chapter of the Letter of St. Paul) to the Hebrews,[7] and (St. John) Damascene (<u>On the Orthodox Faith</u>), in the first book, chapter 8: « The Father is the Cause of the Son », it is clear etc..

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Of whatsoever the order is, that is ordered: therefore if among the divine there is an order of nature, the Nature is ordered; but what is ordered is distinguished and numbered:[8] therefore among the divine the Nature is distinguished and numbered; but this (is) false: ergo etc..

2. Likewise, among the divine[9] the Same is Nature and Essence, because "*the Nature*" is the name of the Essence; but among the divine there is in no manner posited an order of essence: therefore neither (one) of nature.

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[5] Here in ch. 3, near the end.
[6] In very many manuscripts, such as A T V Z and edition 1, there is omitted *is* [est].
[7] Homily 2, n. 2: for if the Father is His Cause and Author, much more (is He) of those which have been made through Him. — The words of (St.) John Damascene, <u>On the Orthodox Faith</u>, cited in the passage cited are: The Father is naturally the Cause of the Son.
[8] The Vatican edition, together with a few codices, adds *if this* [si hoc]. A little below this after *but this* [sed hoc], in some manuscripts, such as V X and Z,

there is added *is* [est].
[9] In very many codices and edition 1 there is lacking *among the divine* [in divinis], but it certainly must be supplied on account of the added reasoning: (*the same is the nature and the essence*) [Trans. note: since this is true only in God].

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3. Item, ubi est ordo, ibi est prius et posterius,[1] ergo si in divinis est ordo naturae, ibi est prius et posterius secundum naturam; sed hoc nullo modo recipitur: ergo nec ordo naturae. Quod autem in divinis non sit prius et posterius secundum naturam, ostenditur sic: « Relativa sunt simul natura »,[2] ergo Pater et Filius, secundum quod Pater et Filius, simul sunt natura; sed Pater secundum id quod est et secundum quod est Pater, simul est natura,[3] quia relationes in divinis non sunt advenientes, nec tantum sunt ratio referendi, sed etiam existendi:[4] ergo Pater et Filius secundum suas hypostases simul sunt natura, ergo non est ibi ordo naturae.

3. Likewise, where (there) is an order, there is a prior and a posterior,[1] therefore if among the divine there is an order of nature, there is a prior and a posterior according to the Nature; but this in no manner is received: therefore neither an order of nature. Moreover, that among the divine there is no prior and posterior according to the Nature, is shown in this manner: « Relatives are by nature together [natura simul] »,[2] therefore the Father and the Son, according to which (They are) the Father and the Son, are together by the Nature; but the Father is at once by Nature [simul natura] according to That which He is and according to which He is the Father,[3] because among the divine the relations are not adventive [advenientes], nor are they only a reckoning of being referred, but (they are) also (a reckoning) of existing:[4] therefore the Father and the Son according to Their Hypostases are together by Nature, therefore there is no order of nature There.

4. Item, in causis creatis videmus gradus, quod[5] quanto substantia creata citius potest, velocius operatur; unde quaedam operantur in tempore, quaedam repente, quaedam subito; et illa causa, quae operatur subito, aliquando non praecedit tempore, sed natura. Si ergo Deus producit Filium secundum omnem nobilitatem et virtutem suae potentiae, et virtus suae potentiae infinitae maior est quam finitae: ergo non tantum simul duratione, sed etiam simul natura producit: ergo non est ibi ordo naturae.

4. Likewise, among created causes we see grades, to the extent that[5] according to as much as a created substance can (act) more swiftly [citius], more quickly [velocius] does it work; whence certain (things) work in a time [in tempore], certain ones unexpectedly [repente], certain ones suddenly [subito]; and that cause, which works suddenly, sometimes does not precede in time [tempore], but in nature. Therefore if God produces the Son according to every nobility and virtue of His power, and the virtue of His power is more infinite than finite: therefore, not only does He produce (the Son) simultaneous in duration, but also simultaneous by nature: therefore there is no order of nature There.

5. Item, videmus in cognoscibilibus, quod quaedam habent *sui* cognitionem et cogitationem[6] investigando et posterius tempore — et loquor de actuali, non de habituali — ut anima humana; et quaedam simul duratione, ut Angelus: ergo si Dei

5. Likewise, we see among cognizables, that certain ones have a cognition of themselves and thought [cogitationem][6] by investigating and posterior in time — and I speak of actual, not of habitual (cognition) — such as the human soul (does); and

cognitio et dictio sive locutio non est accidens, sed multo nobilior et virtuosior[7] quam omnis creatura, habet verbum intelligentiae, non antum simul duratione, sed etiam natura: ergo etc.

certain ones simultaneous in duration, as an Angel (does): therefore if God's cognition and speaking or locution is not an accident, but much more noble and more virtuous[7] than every creature, He has a Word of understanding, not only simultaneous in duration, but also in nature: ergo etc..

CONCLUSIO.

In divinis recte dicitur esse ordo naturae, id est ordo naturalis originis.

CONCLUSION

Among the divine there is rightly said to be an order of nature, that is, an order of natural origin.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ordo dicitur esse[8] alicuius dupliciter: aut sicut *ordinati*, aut sicut *rationis ordinandi*. Ordo in divinis sicut *ordinati* dicitur personae Patris vel[9] Filii vel Spiritus sancti; sicut *rationis ordinandi* dicitur naturae. Natura enim dicit vim productivam, secundum quod dicit Philosophus,[10] quod « est vis insita rebus ex similibus similia producens ». In divinis autem est ordo secundum productionem, ideo[11] dicitur ibi ordo naturae, id est naturalis orginis. Unde genitivus ille non construitur *subiective*, sicut cum dicitur albedo Petri, sed *ex vi declarationis essentiae*, ut cum dicitur albedo claritatis vel homo auctoritatis. Et ideo resolvitur[12] in duos, ut sit sensus: *ordo naturae*, id est naturalis originis.

I respond: It must be said, that an "order" is said to be[8] of anything in a twofold manner: either as *of that which has been ordered* [sicut ordinati], or as *of the reason for ordering*. "Order" among the divine, as *of that which has been ordered*, is said of the Person of the Father and/or[9] of the Son and/or of the Holy Spirit; as *of the reason for ordering* it is said of the Nature. For "nature" means the productive force, according to which the Philosopher[10] says, that « it is the force implanted in things producing similars out of similars ». But among the divine the order is according to production, for that reason[11] there is said (to be) There an order of nature, that is, of natural origin. Wherefore, that genitive is not construed *subjectively* (i. e. "of the Nature"), as when there is said "the whiteness of Peter", but *from the force of a declaration of essence*, as when there is said "the whiteness of brightness" and/or "a man of authority". And for that reason (the genitive)[12] is resolved into two, so that the sense is: *an order of nature*, that is (an order) of natural origin.

1. Ex hoc patet primum quod obiicit,[13] quia obiicit, ac si diceretur ordo esse naturae ut rei ordinatae. Patet etiam secundum, quia[14] essentia dicitur in absolutione omnimoda, non ut alterius principium; natura vero dicit ut alterius principium, unde dicit comparationem ad productionem sive emanationem.

1. From this is clear the first which objects,[13] because it objects, as if the order were said of the Nature as of a thing ordered. The second is also clear, because[14] "essence" is said in complete abstraction [in abstractione omnimoda], not "as the principle of another"; but "nature" means "as the principle of another", whence it means a comparison to the production or emanation.

Unde[15] ulterius attendendum, quod ordo secundum naturalem originem in his inferioribus duo dicit, scilicet *emanationem* et *antecessionem*. Et ratio huius est, quia emanatio in his inferioribus ponit diversitatem substantialem. Unde quod

Whence[15] it must be further attend to, that "order according to a natural origin" among these inferiors means two (things), namely *emanation* and *antecedence*. And the reason for this is, that emanation among these inferiors posits a diversity of

emanat in his inferioribus, est effectus, et quod producit est causa; et ideo dicitur *causa*, cuius esse sequitur aliud;[16] et . . .

substance [diversitatem substantialem]. Wherefore, what emanates among these inferiors, is an effect, and what produces is a cause; and for that reason *a cause* is said (to belong) to that which the other "being" follows;[16] and . . .

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[1] Praestamus antiquam lectionem mss. et ed. 1, dum Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc in hac propositione post *ordo* addit *naturae*, et verbo *posterius* adiungit *secundum naturam*, ac mox bis omittit *secundum naturam*, in qua lectione vis argumentationis debilitatur. — De principiis huius obiectionis cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Priori.
[2] Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Relativis.
[3] Mutila lectio Vat., in qua haec propositio *sed Pater* usque *natura* omittitur, resarcitur ope mss. et ed. 1. Mox cod. X *ergo non* pro *nec*.
[4] Cfr. supra d. 7. dub. 4.
[5] Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 *quia*. Paulo infra plures codd. ut C E G H K R S U *operatur* loco *operantur*.
[6] Codd. inter se dissident; alii enim ut B D F I K S V W X Y ponunt *cognitionem*, cod. O *aliorum cognitionem*, ceteri vero cum ed. 1 *cogitationem*, quae lectio et in se melior est et maiore numero mss. fulcitur; Vat. omittit *et cogitationem*. In cod. Z *in cognoscentibus* pro *in cognoscibilibus*. Paulo infra post *habituali* supple cum cod. bb *cognitione*. Dein codd. L O post *duratione* addunt *sed posterius natura*.
[7] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *nobilius et virtuosius*.
[8] In aliquibus mss. ut A S T Y etc. deest *esse*.
[9] Vat., antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, hic et paulo post *et* loco *vel*.
[10] Vide supra pag. 134, nota 10.
[11] Aliqui codd. ut L O *et ideo*, alii ut K S V ee *et* loco *ideo*; plures ut A F H I T bb cc cum sex primis edd. *id est* pro *ideo*. Paulo infra, postulantibus mss. et ed. 1, loco *parietis* substituimus *Petri*, ubi dein a codd. aa bb adiungitur *quia ordo non ordinatur vel ordo non est illud quod ordinatur*. Mox post *essentiae* incongrue plures mss. ut B E K V addunt *id est naturalis originis*, ac dein fide mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus verba *vel homo auctoritatis*.
[12] Supple: genitivus. De significatione genitivi cfr. supra d. 3. p. II.dub. 3, et infra d. 34. dub. 5, ac d. 41. dub. 2; hoc ultimo loco ait: Et si obiiciatur, quod unus genitivus non construitur ex illa vi (declarationis essentiae); dicendum, quod verum est, nisi habeat virtutem duorum. Unde bene dicitur: *vir sanguinis* et *homo auctoritatis*, similiter: *electio gratiae*, id est gratuitae bonitatis.
[13] Vat. *obiicitur*, sed contra mss., quorum plures ut I S V bb cum ed. 1 dein perperam omittunt *quia obiicit*.
[14] Fide plurium mss. et ed. 1 substituimus hic *quia* pro ambiguo *quod*, et paulo infra, postulantibus vetustioribus codd. et ed. 1, posuimus *unde dicit* loco *ideo dicit*.
[15] Aliqui codd. ut F G Y cum ed. 1 omittunt *Unde*, et mox in nonnullis codd. ut S W post *ordo* additur

[1] We present the ancient reading of the manuscripts and of edition 1, while the Vatican edition, together with the more recent codex cc, in this proposition after *an order* [ordo] adds *of nature* [naturae], and to the word *posterior* [posterius] adds *according to nature* [secundum naturam], and next twice omits *according to nature* [secundum naturam], in which reading the force of the argumentation is weakened. — On the principles of this objections, cf. Aristotle, On the Predicaments, ch. "On the Prior".
[2] Aristotle, On the Predicaments, ch. "On Relatives".
[3] The mutilated reading of the Vatican edition, in which this proposition *but the Father is at once . . . He is the Father* [sed Pater . . . simul est natura] is omitted, is repaired with the help of the manuscripts and edition 1. Next codex X has *therefore they are not only* [ergo non sunt] for *nor are they only* [nec tantum sunt].
[4] Cf. above d. 7, dubium 4.
[5] The Vatican edition, contrary to very many codices and edition 1, has *because* [quia] for *to the extent that* [quod]. A little below this very many codices, such as C E G H K R S and U, read in the singular *a certain (cause) works . . . a certain one . . .* etc. [quaedam operator etc.].
[6] The codices disagree among themselves, for some, such as B D F I K S V W X and Y, have *cognition*[cognitionem], codex O *a cognition of others* [aliorum cognitionem], but all the others, together with edition 1, read *thought* [cogitationem], which reading both in itself is better and is supported by a greater number of manuscripts; the Vatican edition omits *and thought* [et cogitationem]. In codex Z there is read *among cognizers* [in cognoscentibus] for *among cognizables* [in cognoscibilibus]. A little below this after *habitual* [habituali] supply together with codex bb *cognition* [cognitione]. Then codices L and O after *duration* [duratione] add *but posterior in nature* [posterius natura].
[7] The Vatican edition, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, has *(is) in a much more noble and virtuous manner* [multo nobilius et virtuosius].
[8] In some manuscripts, such as A S T Y etc., there is lacking *to be* [esse].
[9] The Vatican edition, with the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 striving against this, here and a little after this, has *and* [et] in place of *and/or* [vel].
[10] See above d. 7, a. sole, q. 1, page 134, footnote 10.
[11] Some codices, such as L and O, read *and for that reason* [et ideo], others, such as K S V and ee, have *and* [et] in place of *for that reason* [ideo]; very many, such as A F H I T bb and cc, together with the six first editions, have *that is* [id est] in place of *for that*

substantiae.

[16] Vide supra pag. 120, nota 7, ubi excipias ed. 1, quae cum Vat. legit: *ad cuius esse* etc. — Paulo infra post *posterius* praepositio *in* deest in cod. Z et ed. 1. Mox plures codd. ut A S W Y *sequitur* loco *consequitur*.

reason [ideo]. A little below this, as required by the manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *of Peter* [Petri] in place of *of the wall* [parietis], where there is then added by codices aa and bb *because order is not ordered and/or order is not that which is ordered* [quia ordo non ordinatur vel ordo non est illud quod ordinatur]. Next after *of essence* [essentiae] very many manuscripts, such as B E K and V, incongruously add *that is of a natural origin* [id est naturalis originis], and then, trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied the words *and/or a man of authority* [vel homo auctoritatis].

[12] Supply: the genitive. On the signification of the genitive, cf. above d. 3, p. II, dubium 3, and below in d. 34, dubium 5, and in d. 41, dubium 2: in this last he says: And if it be objected, that one genitive is not constructed from that force (of a declaration of essence); it must be said, that it is true, unless (the word in the genitive) has the virtue of both (manners of signification). Whence there is rightly said: “*a man of the blood*” and “*a man of authority*”; similarly “*the election of grace*”, that is “of gratuitous goodness”.

[13] The Vatican edition reads *is objected* [obiicitur], but contrary to the manuscripts, many of which, such as I S V and bb, together with edition 1, then faultily omits *because it objects* [quia obiicit].

[14] Trusting in very many manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted here *because* [quia] for the ambiguous *that/because/which* [quod], and a little below, as required by the older codices and edition 1, we have put *whence it means* [unde dicit] in place of *for that reason it means* [ideo dicit].

[15] Some codices, such as F G Y, together with edition 1, omit *Whence* [Unde], and next in not a few codices, such as S and W, read *an order of substance* [ordo substantia] for *order* [ordo].

[16] See above d. 5, dubium 3, page 120, footnote 7, where if you except edition 1, which with the Vatican edition reads: *is said according to the being which the other follows* [dicitur causa ad esse etc.]. — A little below this (on the next page) after *posterior* [posterius] in codex Z and edition 1 the *in* [in] is lacking [Trans. note: which must be supplied in English]. Next very many codices, such as A S W and Y, read *there does not follow* [non sequitur] for *there is not consequent* [non consequitur].

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quia aliud in natura, ideo posterius in natura. In divinis autem est emanatio, ad quam non consequitur essentiae diversitas vel naturae, ideo nec prius nec posterius natura, sed simul natura. Et ideo in divinis non recipitur[1] ratio *causae* vel effectus secundum Latinos, sed nomen *principii*, quamvis Graeci, extenso nomine, utantur nomine causae pro nomine principii. Et ideo in divinis est ordo naturae, non quo alter sit posterior altero, sed quo alter ex altero. Et

because (there is) another in nature, for that reason (there is) a posterior in nature. But among the divine there is an emanation, to which there is not consequent a diversity of essence and/or of nature, for that reason neither “a prior nor posterior” in nature, but a “together” in nature. And for that reason there is not received[1] among the divine a reckoning of *cause* and/or of effect, according to the Latins, but the noun “principle” (is),

hoc est quod dicit Augustinus in littera.[2]

although the Greeks, as an extended name, use the noun “cause” for the noun “principle”. And for that reason among the divine there is a order of nature, not by which the One is posterior to the Other, but by which the One (is) out of the Other. And this is what (St.) Augustine says in the text (of Master Peter).[2]

3. Et ex hoc patet, quod tertio obiicitur: quamvis enim in creaturis ordo ponat posterioritatem naturae,[3] non tamen in Deo. Et ideo quamvis non sit ibi posterioritas, non sequitur, quin bene sit ibi ordo.

3. And from this is clear, what is objected third: for although among creatures an order posits a posteriority of nature,[3] yet (it does) not in God. And for that reason, though there is not a posteriority There, it does not follow, that there is no goodly order There.

Ex his patent obiecta ad utramque partem. Concedendum est ergo, quod aliquo modo reperitur in divinis ordo naturae, sicut ostendunt primae rationes; tertia tamen[4] deficit, quia nomen causae non reperitur in divinis secundum Latinos proprie.

From these are clear the objections to each part. Therefore it must be conceded, that in some manner there is found among the divine an order of nature, just as the first reasons show; the third,[4] however, is deficient, because the name “cause” is not found among the divine in a proper (sense) [proprie], according to the Latins.

Quod obiicitur ad oppositum patet, quia ordo non est naturae ut rei ordinatae.

What is objected in the proposed is clear, because the order is not of the Nature as of a thing ordered.

2. Patet etiam quod obiicitur de divina[5] essentia, quia est nomen absolutum nec importat rationem originis.

2. There is also clear, what is objected concerning the Divine[5] “Essence”, because it is an absolute name and does not convey a reckoning of origin.

5. Ultimum[6] patet, quia non est ibi ordo naturae, quo alter prior altero, sed quo alter ex altero.

5. The last[6] is clear, because there is no order of nature There, by which the One (is) prior to the Other, but (there is an order) by which the One (is) out of the Other.

SCHOLION.

I. Haec quaestio orta esse videtur ex verbo S. Augustini apud Magistrum (hic c. 3.) et in 1. fundam., quod in divnis dicatur *ordo naturae*. Quodsi hoc intelligitur in eo sensu, quod *ipsa natura* ordinetur, procul dubio esset falsum, cum in natura non sit nec relatio nec ordo; si vero intelligitur, quatenus natura est *ratio ordinandi*, in sano sensu intelligi potest. Nam ordo originis, qui est inter Patrem et Filium, est per naturam. Et ex Alexandro notandum, quod alio modo dicitur *natura*, alio modo *essentia*, quia natura super essentiam addit rationem *virtutis productivae* sive *principii agendi*, et ratione huius connotati dici potest ordo naturae. Alii intelligunt *ordo naturae* in sensu originis naturalis, non voluntariae. De duplici significatione genitivis, quae est fundamentum responsionis, vide p. 374

SCHOLIUM

I. This question seems to have arisen from the phrase of St. Augustine, cited in Master (Peter’s text) here in ch. 3 and in the first argument of the fundament (of this question), that among the divine there is said (to be) *an order of nature* [ordo naturae]. Which if this is understood in that sense, which *the Nature itself* be ordered, would be without a doubt false, since in the Nature there is neither relation nor an order; however if it is understood, to the extend that the Nature is the *reason for ordering*, it can be understood in a sane sense. For the order of origin, which is among the Father and the Son, is through the Nature. And from Alexander (of Hales) it must be noted, that “*nature*” is said in one manner, “*essence*” in another manner, because “nature” adds above “essence” the

nota 12.

reckoning of *productive virtue* or *of a principle of acting*, and by reason of this connotation there can be said (to be) an order of nature. Others understand "order of nature" in the sense of a natural origin, not a voluntary (one). On the twofold signification of the genitive, which is the foundation of the response, see p. 374, footnote 12.

II. In re principali omnes conveniunt; tamen Scot. (l. c.) cum nonnullis, et antiquis et modernis, in *modo loquendi* a ceteris discedit asserendo, *ordinem* originis importare etiam habitudinem secundum *prius et posterius*, quae tamen non sit *durationis*. De rationibus, quare sic loquitur, videsis Rada, controv. 5; Macedo, coll. 8. diff. 4. sect. 1. Sed Seraphicus cum S. Thoma, Richardo et plurimis aliis non admittit vocabulum *priors* et *posterioris* in divinis. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. a. 46. n. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unic. a. 5. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 4. — Aegid. R., sicut in q. praecedente. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 52. q. 2; a. 54. a. 5. n. 12. et q. 6. n. 26. et 34. — Biel, I. Sent. d. 9. a. 3.

II. In the principal matter all agree; however (Bl. John Duns) Scotus (loc. cit. below) with not a few others, both ancient and modern, departs in his manner of speaking from all the others by asserting, that the *order* of origin conveys also a habitude according to a *prior and posterior*, which however is not (one) of *duration*. On the reasons, for which he speaks in this manner, see Rada, controversy 5; Macedo, collation 8, indifference 4, section 1. But the Seraphic (Doctor) together with St. Thomas, Richard (of Middleton) and very many others, does not admit the terms "*prior*" and "*posterior*" among the divine. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, a. 46, n. 2. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. sole, a. 5. — Richard of Middleton, here in q. 4. — Giles the Roman, the same as in the preceding question. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 52, q. 2; a. 54, q. 5, n. 12, and q. 6, nn. 26 and 34. — (Gabriel) Biel, Sent., Bk. I, d. 9, a. 3.

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[1] Vat. cum pluribus mss. *accipitur*, sed obstant alii codd. ut G H Z aa bb etc. cum ed. 1 et usus loquendi.
[2] Hic, c. 3. circa finem: Nec cum dicitur Filius a Patre genitus, ostenditur inaequalitas substantiae, sed ordo naturae, non quo alter prior esset altero, sed quo alter est ex altero.
[3] Ex multis mss. ut A C F G H I L O R S T W etc. et ed. 1 supplevimus *naturae*, et paulo infra ex fere omnibus codd.et ed. 1 *ideo*. Mox cod. V *possit ibi esse ordo* pro *sit ibi ordo*.
[4] A vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 abest *ratio*, quod Vat. hic addit.
[5] Multi codd. etiam hic, sicut in ipsa obiectione, omittunt *divina*, loco cuius ed. 1 habet *natura et*.
[6] In cod. Y additur *etiam*. Mox post *prior* ed. 1 adiungit *vel posterior*.

[1] The Vatican edition, together with very many manuscripts, has *there is not accepted* [accipitur], but the other codices, such as G H Z aa bb etc., together with edition 1 and the common usage of language, withstand this.
[2] Here in ch. 3, near the end: Nor when the Son is said (to be) begotten from the Father, is there shown an inequality of Substance, but (rather) an order of nature, not by which the One would be prior to the Other, but by which the One is out of the Other.
[3] From many manuscripts, such as A C F G H I L O R S T W etc., and edition 1, we have supplied *of nature* [naturae], and a little below this, from nearly all the codices and edition 1, we have supplied *for that reason* [ideo]. Next codex V has *there can be no goodly order There* [quin bene posit ibi esse ordo].
[4] From the older manuscripts and edition 1 there is absent *reason* [ratio], which the Vatican adds here.
[5] Many codices, just as in the objection itself, also omit here *the Divine* [divina], in place of which edition 1 has *"nature" and* [natura et].
[6] In codex Y there is added also [etiam]. Next after *prior* [prior] edition 1 adds *and/or posterior* [vel posterior].

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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XX.

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 375-377.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XX

DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 375-377.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo dubitatur de prima ratione, quam ponit Magister: *Omnia quae habet Pater, habet Filius*: ergo *quantam potentiam habet Pater, habet Filius*. Istud argumentum non videtur valere, quia mutatur *quid* in *quantum*: nam *omnia* distribuit pro substantia, *quantum* autem dicit quantitatem.

Doubt I

In this part there are doubts about the text (of Master Peter), and first there is the doubt [dubitatur] concerning the first reason, which Master (Peter) posits: *All which the Father has, the Son has*: therefore *as much power as the Father has, the Son has*. That argument of his does not seem to be valid, because *what* is changed into *how much*; for "*all*" distributes (logically) for "the Substance", but "*how much*" means "a quantity".

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quamvis talis modus arguendi non valeret, si differret quantitas et substantia, tamen ubi idem est, omnimodam habet necessitatem; et quia hoc est[7] in divinis, ideo argumentum bonum est.

I respond: It must be said, that although such a manner of arguing would not be valid, if quantity and the substance differed, yet where these are the same thing [idem est], (the truth of the argument) has an omnimodal necessity; and because this (identity) is[7] among the divine, for that reason the argument is a good one.

Posset tamen dici, quod praedictum

Yet it can be said, that the aforesaid

argumentum in qualibet materia est bonum. Habere enim non dicitur aliquis solum substantialia, sed etiam proprietates: ergo sequitur, cum *omnia* distributat pro omnibus habitis,[8] quod habeat etiam proprietates: ergo cum nullam potentiam habeat unus, quam non habeat alter, ergo nihil potest unus, quod non potest alter: ergo si unus omnipotens est, et alter; et ita patet, quod hic non est figura dictionis, quia *omnia* distribuit hic pro rebus omnium generum.[9]

argument is in any subject [materiam] good. For someone is not said to have only that which pertains to his substance [habere solum substantialia], but also properties: therefore it follows, since "*all*" distributes (logically) for "all things had" [omnibus habitis],[8] that He has also properties: therefore since One has no power, which the Other does not have, therefore one can (do) nothing, which the Other cannot (do): therefore if One is omnipotent, the Other (is) also; and thus it is clear, that this (verse) is not a figure of speech, because "*all*" does distribute (logically) for "things of all kinds".[9]

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[7] Supplevimus hic et mox post *bonum* ex fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 *est*. Paulo ante loco *arguendi* nonnulli codd. ut S W Y *argumentandi*.
[8] Vat. cum uno alterover tantum codice perperam *habitibus*.
[9] Aristot., I. Elench. c. 3. (c. 4.) fallaciam figurae dictionis ita definit: « Quae autem propter figuram dictionis sunt accidunt, quando (propter similitudinem unius dictionis cum alia) non idem ut idem interpretatur, ut masculinum femininum, vel femininum masculinum, vel quod inter heec est (scil. neutrum) alterum horum, vel rursus quale quantum, vel quantum quale, vel faciens patiens » etc. — Dupliciter fieri potest distributio termini *omnis*, nempe *pro singulis generum* i. e. pro singulis individuis, quae sub eodem genere et sub eadem specie continentur, et *pro generibus singulorum* i. e. pro solis generibus vel speciebus, non autem pro individuis sub generibus vel speciebus contentis.

[7] We supply here and in the next clause *is* [est], from nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1. A little before this in place of *of arguing* [arguendi], not a few codices, such as S W and Y, have *of making an argument* [argumentandi].
[8] The Vatican edition, with only one or the other codex, faultily reads *"all habits"* [omnibus habitibus].
[9] Aritostle, List of Sophistic Errors, Bk. I, ch. 3 (ch. 4), defines the fallacy of a figure of speech thus: « But those which are on account of a figure of speech, when occur (on account of the similitude of one saying with another) the not-same is interpreted as the same, such as the masculine as the feminine, and/or the feminine as the masculine, and/or that which is between these (that is the neuter) as one or the other of these, and/or again "what kind" as "how much", and/or "how much" as "what kind", and/or doing as suffering » etc.. — A (logical) distribution of the term "*all*" can be done in a twofold manner, namely for "*each of the genera*", i. e. for "each individual", which is contained under the same genus and under the same species, and for "*genera of each*", i. e. for "only the genera and/or species", but not for the individuals contained under the genera and/or species.

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p. 376

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Non potest qui accepit inaequalis esse ei qui dedit*. Videtur enim dicere falsum, quia si hoc, cum omnis creatura sit accipiens, nulla esset inaequalis Deo; sed hoc[1] falsum: ergo et primum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Augustinus non loqitur generaliter[2] de quolibet accipiente sive de quolibet modo, sed de eo qui accipit omnia; et talis accipiens non potest esse inaequalis.

Doubt II

Likewise is asked concerning this which (St. Augustine) says: *He, who accepts, cannot be unequal to Him, who has given*. For it seems that he says (something) false, because if this, since every creature is accepting, none would be unequal to God; but this (is)[1] false: therefore also the first.

I respond: It must be said, that (St.) Augustine does not speak generally[2] of anyone accepting or of any manner, but of that which accepts all; and such a one accepting cannot be unequal.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de alia ratione: *Si non potuit, ergo fuit impotens*. Videtur enim male arguere, quia similiter posset argui de Filio et Spiritu sancto: si non potuit Filium aequalem producere: ergo etc.

Doubt III

Likewise is asked of the other reason: *If he could not, therefore He was impotent*. For it seems that he argues badly, because similarly could it be argued of the Son and the Holy Spirit: if He could not produce an equal Son: therefore etc..

Respondeo: Dicendum ad hoc, quod non competit generatio nisi hypostasi Patris, sicut alibi tactum est;[3] ideo non valet nec est simile.

I respond: It must be said to this, that generation is the competence [competit] of naught but the Hypostasis of the Father, just as has been touched upon elsewhere;[3] for that reason (the argument) is not valid, nor is it similar.

Dub. IV.

Item dubitatur de alia parte auctoritatis,[4] quia illud argumentum non videtur valere: *Potuit producere aequalem, et non produxit sive genuit: ergo invidus fuit*, quia similiter[5] potest argui: potuit istam creaturam facere meliorem, et non fecit: ergo invidit. *Si tu dicas*, quod invidia considerat semper parem vel superiorem, sicut dicit Gregorius super illud Iob quinto:[6] *Parvulum occidit invidia*; obiicitur tunc, quia si Filium genuisset minorem, non habuisset ibi locum invidia: ergo videtur quod ista solutio non solvit. *Item*, in creaturis non valet: iste artifex potuit facere istam rem meliorem et non fecit: ergo fuit invidus; quare ergo tenet[7] in Deo?

Doubt IV

Likewise is doubted concerning the other part of the authority,[4] because that argument does not seem to be valid: *He could produce an equal, and He did not produce or beget: therefore He was envious*, because it can similarly[5] be argued: 'He could make that creature better, and He did not: therefore He envies (it)'. *If you say*, that envy always considers a peer and/or superior, just as (St.) Gregory says on that (verse) in the fifth (chapter) of Job:[6] *The small does envy slay*; it is then objected, that if He would have begotten a lesser Son, envy would have had no place there: therefore it seems that that solution does not solve (the objection). *Likewise*, it is not valid among creatures: 'this craftsman could make that thing better and did not: therefore he was envious'; for what reason, therefore, does it hold[7] in God?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod invidia artificis producentis non attenditur in productione rei inaequalis vel minus bonae, nisi[8] ubi res de sui natura exigit tale esse; tunc enim necessario concluditur, quod aut producens non potuit, aut invidit, si potuit et non poduxit, quia non fecit, ut debuit. Et quoniam filius, eo ipso quo filius est, natus est perfecte imitari, si non genuit filium in perfecta imitatione, concluditur, quod aut producens impotens fuit, aut invidit. Et ideo patet, quod non est simile de Creatore et creatura, arca et artifice.[9]

I respond: It must be said, that the envy of a craftsman producing is not attained in the production of an unequal and/or less good thing, unless[8] where the thing from its own nature requires [egixit] that it be such; for then there is necessarily concluded, that either the one producing could not, or envied, if he could and did not produce, because he did not do, as he ought have. And since a son for this by which he is a son, is bound [natus] to perfectly imitate, if one does not beget a son in perfect imitation, one concludes, that either the one producing was impotent, or he is envious. And for that reason it is clear, that it is not similar concerning the Creator and the creature, a chest [arca] and a craftsman.[9]

Dub. V.

Doubt V

Item dubitatur de tertia ratione, quam facit: *Si homo pater potiut gignere filium sibi aequalem,* ergo *et Deus*, quia illud argumentum non valet: homo habet alium hominem sibi aequalem vel habere potest: ergo et Deus similiter; quoniam Deus de sua nobilitate hoc habet, quod nullus potest ei aequari; et ita videtur ratio Augustinis non valere.

Likewise is doubted concerning the third reason, which (St. Augustine) gives [facit]: *If a man, as father, could beget a son equal to himself*, therefore *God also* (could), because this argument is not valid: 'a man has another man equal to himself and/or could have one: therefore also God similarly'; since God of His own nobility has this, that no one can be equal [aequari] to Him; and thus the reason of (St.) Augustine does not seem to be valid.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quodsi aequalitas poneret de necessitate in aequalibus diversitatem in natura, quod tunc non valeret. Sed supposito, quod Deus generet Filium connaturalem sibi, de necessitate sequitur, quodsi homo aequalem genuit, quod Deus multo fortius. Quamvis enim imperfectionis sit aequari diverso in natura, tamen aequari connaturali perfectionis est; alioquin divina natura esset in aliquo imperfecte;[10] quod si hoc est impossibile, patet etc.

I respond: It must be said, that if equality would posit of necessity among equals a diversity in nature, that then (the reason of St. Augustine) would not be valid. But with it supposed, that God would generate a Son connatural to Himself, it of necessity follows, that if a man begot an equal, that much more strongly (could) God. For although it belongs to imperfection to be equal to (another) diverse in nature, yet to be equal to (another) connatural (to one's self) belongs to perfection, otherwise the Divine Nature would be in Someone imperfectly;[10] which if this is impossible, it is clear that etc..

Dub. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *quaestio aequalitatis est qualis aut quantus*. Videtur enim dicere falsum, quia *quale* dicit qualitatem, et secundum eam attenditur similitudo, non aequalitas, quia «*kind*» proprium est qualitatis secundum eam simile vel dissimile dici ».[11]

Doubt VI

Likewise is asked of this which he says, that the *question of equality is a "of which kind?" or a "how much?"*. For it seems that he says (something) false, because "*of what kind*" means a quality, according to this a similitude is attained, not an equality, because « it is proper to a quality that (something) be said to be similar and/or dissimilar to it ».[11]

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod de qualitate est loqui dupliciter: uno modo, prout dicitur *denominans*; . . .

I respond: It must be said that of "quality" there is a twofold manner of speaking [est loqui dupliciter]: in one manner, insofar as the *one denominating* is meant: . . .

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[1] In cod. V addicitur *est*.
[2] Fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic additam coniunctivam particulam *et*. Paulo infra post *omnia* cod. O non male addit *naturaliter*.
[3] Dist. 7. q. 2. — Paulo ante ex mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *Dicendum*.
[4] Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *rationis*.
[5] Cod. dd *eodem modo* pro *similiter*, qui et mox, omisso *istam*, post *meliorem* addit *tali*; cod. V *posset* loco *potest* et paulo post pro *invidit* ponit *invidus fuit*.
[6] Vers. 2; Libr. V. Moral. c. 46. n. 84: Invidere enim non possumus, nisi eis quos nobis in aliquo meliores putamus.
[7] Ita fere omnes codd. cum ed. 1, dum Vat. *etiam*

[1] In codex V there is added *is* [est].
[2] Trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have expunged here the added conjunctive particle *and* [et]. A little below this after *all* [omnia], codex O adds, not badly, *naturally* [naturaliter].
[3] Distinction 7, q. 2. — A little before this, we have supplied from the manuscripts and edition 1 *It must be said* [Dicendum].
[4] The Vatican edition, contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1, reads *of the reason* [rationis].
[5] Codex dd has *in the same manner* [eodem modo] for *similarly* [similiter], which also next, having omitted *that* [istam], after *better* [meliorem] adds

non loco *ergo*.
[8] Praeferimus lectionem plurium mss. ut F G T Z aa bb lectioni Vat. ponendo *nisi* pro *sed*, quae lectio iam ex grammaticali contructione commendatur; aliqui codd. ut S T cum ed. 1 modo affirmativo, omissis particulis *non* et *nisi*, propositionem exhibent, in qua pauci codd. ut S Y loco *producentis* legunt *potentis*. Mox plures codd. ut F G H I X Y cc dd cum edd. 1, 2, 3 *talis* pro *tale*.
[9] Concordant B. Albert., hic a. 6. — S. Thom., hic circa lit. — Richard. a. Med., hic a. 2.
[10] Cod. X *imperfecta*, qui dein cum cod. V habet *et* loco *quod*.
[11] Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Qualitate. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 342, nota 6.
[12] Nempe forma aliqua accidentalis, secundum quam, ut ait Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quali, quales quidam esse dicuntur. — Et paulo infra dicit idem: qualia ergo dicuntur quae denominative a dictis qualitatibus dicuntur (v. g. a candore candidus et a grammatica grammaticus). — Cod. T voci *denominans* praefigit particulam *ut*. Paulo post ex multis mss. ut F G H S T W Y Z aa bb cum ed. 1 nomini *dispositio* praemissimus *est* loco *dicitur*, ac dein fide plurimorum codd. et ed. 1 substituimus *melior* pro *nobilior*.

than such [tali]; codex V has the subjunctive *could have been* [posset] for *can be* [potest] and a little after this, for *He envies (it)* [invidit] has *He was envious* [invidus fuit].
[6] Verse 2; Morals, Bk. V, ch. 46, n. 84: For we cannot envy, except those whom we think are better than us in something.
[7] Thus nearly all the codices together with edition 1, while the Vatican edition reads *does it not also* [etiam non] for *therefore does it* [ergo].
[8] We prefer the reading of very many manuscripts, such as F G T Z aa and bb to the reading of the Vatican edition, wherein the former puts *unless* [nisi] for *but* [sed], which reading is already commended by the grammatical construction; some codices, such as S and T, together with edition 1, having omitted the particles *not* [non] and *unless* [nisi], exhibit the proposition in the affirmative, in which a few codices, such as S and Y in place of *a craftsman producing* [artificis producentis] read *an able craftsman* [artificis potentis]. Next very many codices, such as F G H I X Y cc and dd, together with editions 1, 2 and 3, have *of such (a kind)* [talis] for *such* [tale].
[9] Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus) agrees, here in a. 6. — St. Thomas, here on the text. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 2.
[10] Codex X reads *imperfect in Someone* [in aliquo imperfecta], which then together with codex V has *and* [et] in place of *which* [quod].
[11] Aristotle, On the Predicaments., ch. "On Quality". Cf. also above d. 19, p. I, a. sole, q. 1, page 342, footnote 6.
[12] Namely some accidental form, according to which, as Aristotle says, On the Predicaments, ch. "On Which Kind", they are indeed said to be of such a kind [quales]. — And a little below this he says the same: They are said (to be) of such a kind, which are denominatively said by the said qualities (v. g. "bright" from "brightness", "grammatical" from "grammar"). — Codex T reads *insofar as it is said as one denominating* [prout dicitur ut denominans]. A little after this (on the next page), from many manuscripts, such as F G H S T W Y Z aa and bb, together with edition 1, we have, before *a disposition* [dispositio], put *it is* [est] in place of *it is said (to be)* [dicitur], and then trusting in very many codices and edition 1, we have substituted *better* [melior] for *more noble* [nobilior].

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alio modo, prout est *dispositio nobilitatis*; et secundum hanc attenditur maior et minor nobilitas, et ita melior res dicitur. Et quia « in spiritualibus idem est maius et melius »,[1] ideo quaestio de aequalitate spectat ad qualitatem, non ex propria ratione nominis, sed ex consequenti, ut visum est.[2]

in another manner, insofar as it is a *disposition of nobility*; and according to this there is attained a greater and lesser nobility, and thus a thing is said (to be) better. And because « in spiritual (things) the same is the greater and the lesser »,[1] for that reason the question of equality looks to quality, not out of a proper reckoning of the name, but out of the consequent, as has been seen.[2]

[1] August., VI. de Trin. c. 8. n. 9. — In immediate sequenti propositione praestamus lectionem veram et contextui conformiorem, quam integre exhibent codd. X Z; Vat. cum ed. 1 et aliquibus mss. *ideo quaestio de qualitate spectat ad aequalitatem*, alii codd., inter quos est etiam cod. T, perperam *ideo quaestio de aequalitate spectat ad aequalitatem*, qui etiam cum edd. 4, 5 in principio responsionis incongrue ponunt *de aequalitate est loqui* pro *de qualitate* etc.
[2] Vide d. 19. p. I. q. 1. et 2. — Cfr. et B. Albert., hic a. 6. in fine et S. Thom., hic in expos. lit.

[1] (St.) Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. VI, chs. 8 and 9. — In the immediately following proposition we present the true reading and the one more conformable to the context, which codices X and Z exhibit in its entirety; the Vatican edition together with some manuscripts reads *for that reason the questions of quality looks to equality* [ideo quaestio de qualitate spectat ad aequalitatem], other codices, among which is also codex T, faultily reads *for that reason the question of equality looks to equality* [ideo quaestio de aequalitate spectat ad aequalitatem], which also together with editions 4 and 5, at the beginning of the response incongruously puts *"equality"* [aequalitate] for *"quality"*.
[2] See d. 19, p. I, qq. 1 and 2. — Cf. also Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 6, at the end, and St. Thomas, here in the exposition of the text.

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.